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Introduction		
	
	
In	the	late	fifteenth	century,	the	German	traveller	Hieronymus	Münzer	referred	to	
Valencia	as	the	largest	and	richest	city	in	the	Iberian	Peninsula,	noting	the	fact	that	it	
had	even	outstripped	Barcelona	as	the	head	of	the	Crown	of	Aragon1.	Whether	this	
sorpasso	actually	happened	and	to	what	extent	is	still	a	matter	of	discussion,	yet	this	
century	was	no	doubt	a	period	of	extraordinary	economic	and	commercial	
development	for	Valencia.	
			After	the	Genoese	and	the	Catalans	had	opened	up	the	straits	of	Gibraltar,	the	city	
became	a	suitable	port	of	call	for	the	Mediterranean	convoys	in	their	way	to	the	
Atlantic,	and	many	foreign	merchants	settled	permanently	in	the	city,	attracted	both	
by	an	institutional	environment	open	to	newcomers	and	a	region	which	was	at	the	
same	time	a	sizeable	output	market	and	a	supplier	of	specialized	agricultural	products	
like	rice,	oranges	and	figs2.	The	local	merchants	typically	made	use	of	the	Catalan	and	
Italian	trading	networks	to	reach	out	faraway	markets,	yet	around	1400	they	were	
already	well	settled	and	even	predominant	in	the	areas	of	Granada,	Fez	and	Tlemcen3.	
However,	the	institutional	bases	of	these	commercial	developments	are	still	wrapped	
up	in	mystery.	After	Barcelona	withdrew	from	southern	Spain	and	Barbaria	in	the	
second	half	of	the	fourteenth	century,	no	official	consular	appointments	are	recorded,	
and	we	know	little	regarding	the	strategies	undertaken	by	the	Valencian	merchants	to	
enforce	their	contracts	when	trading	in	these	parts.				Conventionally,	long-distance	trade	in	late	medieval	times	was	conducted	through	
societies,	commenda	contracts	and	other	related	arrangements,	which	implied	that	a	
principal	(or	merchant-capitalist)	delegated	some	money	or	merchandise	to	an	agent	
(or	merchant-entrepreneur,	factors,	seamen,	etc.),	who	was	bound	to	represent	the	
principal’s	interests	in	return	for	payment	of	some	kind.	However,	this	kind	of	
exchanges	involved	a	full	range	of	hazards.	In	order	for	the	principal	to	advance	his	
money	or	merchandise,	he	might	need	to	make	sure	that	the	agent	would	uprightly	
represent	his	interests,	even	though	he	could	not	directly	monitor	the	latter.	The																																																									1	Puyol,	Julio,	‘Jerónimo	Münzer.	Viaje	por	España	y	Portugal	en	los	años	1494	y	1495’,	Boletín	
de	la	Real	Academia	de	la	Historia,	84	(1924),	pp.	60-70.	
2	Hinojosa	Montalvo,	J.	R.,	‘De	Valencia	a	Portugal	y	Flandes:	relaciones	durante	la	Baja	Edad	
Media’,	Anales	de	la	Universidad	de	Alicante,	1	(1982),	pp.	149-168;	Narbona,	Rafael,	‘Valencia,	
emporio	mediterráneo:	ss.	XIV-XV’,	Fundación	Caja	Madrid,	Reino	y	ciudad.	Valencia	en	su	
historia	(Madrid,	2008),	pp.	101-102.	
3	An	excellent	summary	of	this	process	can	be	found	at	Cruselles,	E.	‘Jerarquización	y	
especialización	de	los	circuitos	mercantiles	valencianos,	finales	del	XIV-primera	mitad	del	XV’,	
Anales	de	la	Universidad	de	Alicante,	7	(1989).	See	also:	Igual,	David,	‘Navegación	y	comercio	
entre	Valencia	y	el	Norte	de	África	durante	el	siglo	XV’,	in	Trillo,	Carmen	(ed.),	Relaciones	entre	
el	Mediterráneo	cristiano	y	el	norte	de	África	en	época	medieval	y	moderna	(Granada,	2004),	
pp.	242-244.	
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principal	needed	some	credible	guarantee	that	the	agent	would	not	either	embezzle	
his	capital	or	misreport	the	venture’s	profitability.	In	a	world	of	prominent	asymmetric	
information	and	legal	fragmentation	as	the	medieval	world	was,	these	were	clear	and	
always	present	perils.	Yet	despite	all	this,	the	Middle	Ages	witnessed	a	remarkable	
flowering	in	international	commerce	that	seemingly	laid	the	foundations	for	the	rise	of	
the	West.	How	can	we	account	for	this?	How	did	merchants,	their	rulers	and	
institutions	manage	to	reduce	moral	hazard	and	enable	agents	to	commit	ex	ante	not	
to	breach	contracts	ex	post?4	With	respect	to	Valencian	commerce,	this	question	
remains	unanswered,	a	surprising	fact	if	we	bear	in	mind	that	there	are	already	several	
insightful	works	devoted	to	other	prominent	trading	cities5.	Avner	Greif	has	suggested	
that	the	Genoese	were	able	to	encourage	credible	commitments	beyond	the	tight	
circle	of	friends	and	relatives	through	a	bilateral	reputation	system	based	on	patron	
relations,	in	which	agent’s	families	were	held	liable	in	case	of	contract	breach6.	
Regarding	Venice,	Yadira	González	has	stressed	the	role	of	the	State	in	gathering	the	
information	to	detect	contract	breaches,	punish	cheaters	when	required	and	
generating	the	rents	needed	to	motivate	merchants	to	keep	their	affiliation	with	
Venice7.	Even	though	the	Catalan	case	has	never	been	tackled	from	a	contract	
enforcement	perspective,	the	relationship	between	the	Monarchy,	the	Council	of	
Barcelona	and	the	Catalan	consular	network	has	attracted	the	attention	of	the	
historians	since	Antonio	de	Capmany,	the	eighteenth	century	scholar	who	composed	
the	first	general	work	on	the	topic8.	Mario	del	Treppo	devoted	his	very	masterpiece	to	
show	how	the	Aragonese	Empire	allowed	the	mercanti	catalani	to	overcome	their	
structural	economic	weaknesses9,	yet	the	contract	enforcement	implications	of	this																																																									4	For	a	general	view	on	the	theory	of	agency,	see	Eggertsson,	T.	Economic	behaviour	and	
institutions	(Cambridge,	1990),	pp.	40-48.	Much	of	our	theoretical	framework	is	based	upon	
Greif,	A.	‘The	fundamental	problem	of	exchange:	A	research	agenda	in	Historical	Institutional	
Analysis’,	European	Review	of	Economic	History,	4	(2000).	See	also	Greif,	A.	‘Commitment,	
Coercion	and	Markets:	The	Nature	and	Dynamics	of	Institutions	Supporting	Exchange’,	in	
Ménard,	C.,	and	Shirley,	M.	Handbook	of	New	Institutional	Economics	(Dordrecth,	2005);	Greif,	
A.	‘Coercion	and	exchange:	How	did	markets	evolve?’	Available	at	SSRN	1304204	(2008);	
Grafe,	R.,	and	Gelderblom,	O.	‘The	Rise	and	Fall	of	the	Merchant	Guilds:	Re-thinking	the	
Comparative	Study	of	Commercial	Institutions	in	Premodern	Europe’,	Journal	of	
Interdisciplinary	History,	XL:	4	(Spring,	2010),	pp.	477-511;	and	Ogilvie,	S.	Institutions	and	
European	Trade:	Merchant	Guilds,	1000-1800	(Cambridge,	2011). 
5	For	twelfth	century	Genoa,	see	Greif,	A.	‘Cultural	beliefs	and	the	organisation	of	society:	
historical	and	theoretical	reflection	on	collectivist	and	individualist	societies’,	The	Journal	of	
Economic	History,	54	(1994),	pp.	912-950;	and	Greif,	A.	Institutions	and	the	Path	to	the	Modern	
Economy:	Lessons	from	Medieval	Trade	(New	York,	2006),	chapters	3	and	9.	For	eleventh	to	
thirteenth	century	Venice,	see	González	de	Lara,	Y.	‘The	secret	of	Venetian	success:	a	public-
order,	reputation-based	institution’,	European	Review	of	Economic	History,	12-3	(2008),	pp.	
247-285.	
6	Greif,	A.	‘Cultural	believes…’;	and	Greif,	A.	Institutions…	
7	González	de	Lara,	Y.	‘The	secret	of	Venetian	success:	a	public-order,	reputation-based	
institution’,	European	Review	of	Economic	History,	vol.	12,	3	(2008),	pp.	247-285.	
8	Capmany,	Antonio.	Memorias	históricas	sobre	la	marina,	comercio	y	artes	de	la	antigua	
ciudad	de	Barcelona	(Madrid,	1779-1792).	
9	Del	Treppo,	Mario.	I	mercanti	catalani	e	l’espansione	della	Corona	d’Aragona	nel	secolo	XV	
(Naples,	1972)	and	Hillgarth,	J.	N.	The	problem	of	a	Catalan	Mediterranean	empire,	1229-1327	
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symbiosis	had	not	been	recognised.	Furthermore,	a	whole	array	of	studies	following	
the	work	of	Capmany	has	usually	concentrated	in	juridical	aspects	of	the	Consulates	
and	their	profuse	body	of	maritime	legislation,	rarely	going	beyond	the	letter	of	the	
law10.	There	is	still	much	left	to	do	regarding	the	actual	functioning	of	such	institutions.	
It	is	worth	noting	that	even	when	studies	intended	to	integrate	juridical	with	historical	
or	analytical	aspects,	they	typically	concentrated	in	Barcelona	and	mistakenly	
overlooked	Mallorca	and	Valencia’s	developments,	failing	to	represent	the	Catalan	
consular	network	as	the	polycentric	and	flexible	web	that	actually	was11.	Daniel	Durán	
i	Duelt	is	probably	the	first	one	to	undertake	a	systematic	study	of	these	Consulates,	
depicting	them	as	evolving	institutions	and	tackling	extensively	the	puzzling	question	
of	Mallorcan	overseas	consulates12.	Moreover,	he	has	called	attention	to	the	poor	
state	of	our	knowledge	regarding	certain	overseas	consulates,	especially	in	North	
Africa13	—an	aspect	that	will	reveal	critical	within	our	argument,	as	we	shall	have	the	
opportunity	to	see.	Cabezuelo	and	Soler	have	also	worked	on	the	consular	disputes	
between	Barcelona	and	Mallorca,	and	there	is	certainly	extensive	literature	on	specific	
overseas	consulates,	ranging	from	Bruges	to	Damascus14.	With	respect	to	the																																																																																																																																																																			
(London,	1975).	On	the	historiographical	debate	that	followed,	which	stretches	to	our	day,	see	
Igual,	Luis.	‘Los	grupos	mercantiles	y	la	expansión	política	de	la	Corona	de	Aragón:	nuevas	
perspectivas’,	in	Tanzini	L.,	and	Tognetti,	S.	(eds.),	Il	governo	dell’economia:	Italia	e	Penisola	
Iberica	nel	basso	Medioevo	(Rome,	2014).	
10	Ferrando,	A.	Llibre	del	consolat	de	mar:	Arxiu	Municipal	de	València,	any	1407	(Valencia,	
1979);	Colón,	G.	And	García,	A.	Llibre	del	consolat	de	mar	(1981,	Barcelona);	Peláez,	M.	
Cambios	y	seguros	marítimos	en	derecho	catalán	y	balear	(Bolonia,	1984).		
11	Prominent	examples	of	this	are	Carrère,	C.	Barcelone,	centre	économique	à	l’époque	des	
difficultés,	1380-1462	(Paris,	1967),	II	vol.,	and	Ferrer	i	Mallol,	M.	T.,	‘El	consolat	de	mar	i	els	
consolats	d’ultramar,	instrument	i	manifestació	de	l’expansió	del	comerç	català’,	in	Ferrer	i	
Mallol,	M.	T.,	and	Coulon,	D.	(ed.),	L’expansió	catalana	a	la	Mediterrània	a	la	Baixa	Edat	
Mitjana	(Barcelona,	1999).		
12	Duran	i	Duelt,	D.	‘La	fi	del	sistema	consular	mallorquí	i	les	seves	repercussions	en	el	català:	el	
cas	dels	consolats	de	Pera	i	Constantinoble’,	in	Rovira	i	Solà,	M	(ed.),	El	temps	del	Consell	de	
Cent:	l’emergència	del	municipi,	segles	XIII-XIV	(Barcelona,	2001),	and	Duran	i	Duelt,	D.	
‘Consolats	de	mar	i	consolats	d’ultramar:	la	defensa	de	l’espai	marítim	en	temps	de	Martí	
l’Humà’,	in	Ferrer	i	Mallol,	M.	T.	Martí	l’Humà:	el	darrer	rei	de	la	dinastia	de	Barcelona,	1396-
1410:	l’interregne	i	el	Compromís	de	Casp	(Barcelona,	2015).	
13	It	is	indeed	thanks	to	his	encouragement	and	advice	that	I	have	undertaken	the	study	of	the	
consular	network	from	the	Valencian	angle.	This	paper	owes	much	to	his	own	intuition.	
14	Cabezelo,	J.	V.,	and	Soler,	J.	L.	‘El	consulado	catalán	de	Sevilla	a	inicios	del	siglo	XVI:	disputas	
políticas	y	realidad	mercantil	en	el	Atlántico’,	in	Homenatge	a	Josefina	Mutgé	i	Vives	
(Barcelona,	2013);	Dopp,	P.	H.	‘Les	relations	egypto-catalanes	et	les	corsaires	au	
commencement	du	quinzième	siècle’,	Bulletin	of	the	Faculty	of	Arts	Fouad	I	University,	XI/I	
(1949),	pp.	3-4;	Gil	Guasch,	M.	‘Fernando	el	Católico	y	los	consulados	catalanes	en	África’,	in	V	
Congreso	de	Historia	de	la	Corona	de	Aragón	(Zaragoza,	1956),	pp.	105-122;	Rohne,	C.	F.	The	
origins	and	development	of	the	catalán	consulados	ultramarinos	from	the	thirteenth	to	the	
fifteenth	centuries	(Los	Angeles,	1966);	López	de	Meneses,	A.	‘Un	siglo	del	Consulado	de	los	
Catalanes	en	Alejandría.	1416-1516’,	in	IX	Congresso	di	Storia	della	Corona	d’Aragona	(Naples,	
1973);	D’Arienzo,	L.	‘Una	nota	sui	consolati	catalani	in	Sardegna	nel	secolo	XIV’,	Anuario	de	
Estudios	Medievales,	10	(1980),	pp.	593-609;	Cabestany,	J.	F.	‘Els	consolats	catalans	d’Ultramar	
a	Sicilia’,	in	Els	catalans	a	Sicilia	(Barcelona,	1992);	Salicrú	i	Lluch,	R.	‘Notes	sobre	el	consolat	de	
catalans	a	Siracusa,	1319-1528’,	in	La	Corona	d’Aragona	in	Italia,	secc.	XIII-XVIII	(Sassari,	1996);	
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Valencian	case,	Enrique	Cruselles	left	several	insightful	comments	on	the	informal	
mechanisms	used	among	merchants	to	enforce	contracts,	but	never	really	posed	this	
problem	in	an	explicit	way,	nor	tried	to	address	it	systematically15.	A	contract	
enforcement	perspective	is	still	needed	to	explain	what	kind	of	incentives	faced	
Valencian	merchants	ex	ante	—when	making	the	decision	to	exchange—	and	ex	post	
—when	agents	could	gain	from	reneging—.	We	need	further	research	to	understand	
how	the	interweaved	Royal,	Catalan	and	Valencian	mercantile	institutions	generated	
verifiable	information	about	contracts,	how	they	punished	cheaters	and	what	kind	of	
alternative	arrangements	were	available	to	deal	with	principal-agent	problems16.	
Specifically,	we	need	to	identify	the	relationship	between	the	urban	and	royal	
institutions	of	Valencia,	her	Consulate	of	the	Sea	and	the	overseas	merchants,	both	in	
relation	to	the	broader	Catalan	consular	network	and	those	areas	where	such	a	
network	was	weak	or	non	available,	like	Granada	and	the	North	of	Africa.	This	is	
precisely	what	we	aim	in	this	paper.	
			In	order	to	answer	such	a	research	question,	we	rely	in	a	selection	of	case	studies	to	
illustrate	the	point,	typically	concerning	disputes	between	merchants,	crew	mutinies,	
mercantile	embezzlements	and	others	of	the	kind.	Some	of	them	have	been	drawn	
from	the	secondary	literature,	yet	analysed	in	the	new	light	of	institutional	theory;	
others	have	been	collected	from	source	publications	and	our	own	archival	work.	
During	the	preliminary	stages	of	this	research,	our	first	move	has	been	to	turn	to	the	
Epistolari	de	la	València	medieval,	an	all-encompassing	book	containing	transcribed	
documents	from	medieval	Valencia,	ranging	from	mentality	issues	to	piracy	and	
trade.17	These	transcribed	documents	came	from	the	Lletres	Misives	collection,	
gathered	in	Valencia’s	Town	Council	archives,	and	consist	of	letters	written	by	the	
aldermen	of	Valencia	(jurats)	addressed	to	a	wide	variety	of	recipients	like	the	king	of																																																																																																																																																																			
Sáinz	de	la	Maza,	‘Il	consolat	dei	Catalani	a	Pisa	durante	il	regno	di	Giacomo	II	d’Aragona.	
Notizie	e	documenti’,	Medioevo.	Saggi	e	Rassegne,	20	(1996),	pp.	195-221;	León-Borja,	I.	‘Los	
cónsules	de	Portugal,	Castilla	y	Aragón	en	Venecia	durante	los	siglos	XV-XVII’,	Revista	de	
historia	moderna:	Anales	de	la	Universidad	de	Alicante,	16	(1997),	pp.	179-214;	Desportes,	P.	
‘El	consulado	catalán	de	Brujas,	1330-1488’,	in	Aragón	en	la	Edad	Media	(Zaragoza,	1999);	
Coulon,	D.	‘Los	consulados	catalanes	en	Siria,	1187-1400:	algunos	datos	de	historia	e	
historiografía’,	in	Narbona	Vizcaíno,	R.	(coord.),	La	Mediterrània	de	la	Corona	d’Aragó,	segles	
XIII-XVI	(Valencia,	2004);	Morocutti,	D.	Damasco	1396:	mercanti	catalani,	genovesi	e	veneziani	
in	una	città	orientale	attraverso	il	registro	del	notaio	Novello	(Trieste,	2006);	Soldani,	M.	E.	
‘Madurs	consellers	o	males	suggestions?	Forme	di	patrocinio,	consulenza	e	consiglio	nelle	
cause	tra	mercanti	a	Barcellona	(secc.	XIV-XV)’,	in	Charageat,	M.,	and	Leveleux-Teixeira,	C.	
(ed.),	Consulter,	juger,	décider:	Le	role	de	l’avis	dans	le	processus	décisionnel	médiéval	(Madrid,	
2007);	Wanderwalle,	A.	‘Brujas,	centro	del	comercio	internacional	y	sede	de	la	nación	Aragón-
Cataluña	en	la	Baja	Edad	Media’,	in	Mira,	E.,	and	Delva,	A.	(eds.),	A	la	búsqueda	del	Toisón	de	
Oro:	la	Europa	de	los	príncipes,	la	Europa	de	las	ciudades	(Valencia,	2007);	Mutgé,	J.	‘El	poder	
dels	consellers	de	Barcelona	a	través	dels	consolats	d’ultramar	(final	del	segle	XIII	i	primer	terç	
del	XIV)’	in	XI	Congrés	d’Història	de	Barcelona	(Barcelona,	2009).	Some	good	general	
information	is	contained	as	well	in	Constable,	O.	Housing	the	Stranger	in	the	Mediterranean	
World:	Lodging,	Trade,	and	Travel	in	Late	Antiquity	and	the	Middle	Ages	(Cambridge,	2004).	
15	Cruselles,	E.	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	siglo	XV	y	sus	libros	de	cuentas	(Castelló	de	la	
Plana,	2007),	pp.	148-149.	
16	Greif,	A.	‘The	fundamental	problem	of	exchange…’.	
17	Rubio,	A.	Epistolari	de	la	València	medieval	(Valencia,	1985).		
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Aragon,	foreign	rulers,	Catalan	overseas	consuls,	royal	officials,	etc.	Departing	from	
these	sources,	which	have	never	been	used	in	relation	to	consular	issues,	our	next	step	
has	been	to	turn	to	Valencia’s	Town	Council	archives	themselves	in	search	of	similar	
untranscribed	documents.	The	Lletres	Misives	collection	is	split	up	in	several	books	
sorted	by	date,	so	we	decided	to	focus	on	the	late	fourteenth	century	and	early	
fifteenth	century,	as	it	is	both	the	consolidation	period	of	the	consular	institution	in	
the	Crown	of	Aragon	and	a	stage	of	commercial	ascent	in	Valencia18.	At	first	I	just	tried	
to	locate	some	of	the	published	letters	in	the	hope	that	nearby	documents	would	
contain	similar	information:	so	I	did	with	the	books	g3-5	(1391-1394),	g3-7	(1400-1403)	
and	g3-11	(1412-1413).	Then	I	concentrated	all	my	efforts	in	only	two	books,	g3-12	
(1413-1415)	and	g3-13	(1415-1418),	reviewing	all	their	documents	in	search	of	letters	
addressed	to	overseas	consuls,	Granadian	and	North	African	kings.	Our	aim	at	this	
point	has	been	to	improve	our	knowledge	on	the	least	studied	areas	(Granada	and	
North	Africa)	in	relation	to	the	least	studied	city,	Valencia,	relying	on	secondary	
literature	for	the	better-known	cases	that	concern	Valencians	or	fellow	Catalans.	
Daniel	Duran	kindly	provided	me	several	unpublished	letters	from	the	Mallorcan	
archives	to	help	me	compose	the	picture	for	the	North	African	area.	All	these	cases	will	
be	complemented	with	detailed	information	on	Catalan	maritime	law,	Catalan	(or	
specifically	Valencian)	privileges	abroad,	institutional	functioning	and	mercantile	
contracts19.	
			We	have	chosen	a	methodology	based	in	case	studies	because	it	is	probably	the	only	
means	to	fully	grasp	the	incentives	involved	in	mercantile	contracting,	as	well	as	the	
institutional	framework	within	which	these	transactions	occurred.	Qualitative	study	of	
cases	has	allowed	us	to	micro-analyse	and	go	beyond	the	observable	features	that	
have	usually	been	the	focus	in	consular	historiography.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	
this	methodology	contrasts	as	well	with	the	statistical	analysis	of	notarial	acts	that	
served	Greif	and	González	to	tackle	the	Genoese	and	Venetian	cases,	although	both	
approaches	are	complementary.		
			In	order	to	tackle	our	research	question,	we	have	split	up	the	paper	into	two	large	
parts.	The	first	one,	The	merchant’s	perspective,	is	devoted	to	explore	both	the	
contractual	arrangements	used	by	the	merchants	from	Valencia	and	their	private	order	
solutions	to	contract	enforcement.	The	role	of	formal	institutions	is	dealt	with	in	the	
second	part,	in	which	we	will	scrutinize	the	functioning	of	the	Valencian	Consulate	of	
the	Sea,	the	problems	of	inter-Catalan	and	cross-national	enforcement	and	the	
distinctive	approach	developed	by	the	merchants	of	Valencia	when	dealing	with	their	
sphere	of	influence,	Granada	and	Barbaria.	Further	space	is	devoted	to	compare	the	
Valencian	case	with	neighbouring	experiences	—particularly,	Barcelona,	Genoa,	Venice	
and	Florence.		
			I	should	especially	thank	Daniel	Duran,	David	Igual	and	Yadira	González,	who	have	
offered	me	stimulating	comments	and	sources	to	undertake	this	small	research.	The	
idea	of	analysing	the	Valencian	role	within	the	Catalan	consular	network	was	
suggested	to	me	by	Daniel	Duran,	who	further	provided	me	with	several	Mallorcan																																																									
18	Cruselles,	E.	‘Jerarquización	y	especialización	de	los	circuitos	mercantiles	valencianos,	finales	
del	XIV-primera	mitad	del	XV’,	pp.	83-109.	
19	In	particular,	the	transcribed	Book	of	the	Consulate	of	the	Sea	of	Valencia	contained	in	
Ferrando,	Llibre	del	consolat	de	mar.		
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sources	that	have	allowed	me	drawing	a	more	complete	picture	on	the	North	African	
consulates.		
	
	
Part	I.	The	merchant’s	perspective	
	
I.1.	The	merchant’s	business	
	
	
Before	dealing	with	the	contract	enforcement	institutions	that	lend	support	to	the	
Valencian	commercial	expansion,	we	would	greatly	benefit	from	an	overview	of	the	
contractual	arrangements	that	structured	such	an	expansion,	since	many	of	their	
features	will	serve	us	as	the	base	for	discussion	in	following	chapters.					The	commercial	society,	called	companya	mercantivol	or	companya	de	mercaderia	in	
the	Catalan	world,	was	already	well	widespread	in	Valencia	by	the	beginning	of	the	
fifteenth	century.	It	allowed	merchants	to	pool	their	capital	investments	and	leave	the	
business	management	to	an	elected	director	or	clavari,	usually	drawn	from	the	
partners	themselves20.	These	directors	were	given	full	discretion	to	operate	in	the	
name	of	the	company,	buy	and	sell	whatever	merchandise	they	considered	and	enter	
into	contracts	with	any	operator	they	chose	in	order	to	carry	on	the	company’s	
undertakings.	The	renowned	Lobera-Junyent	company,	yet	from	Barcelona,	provides	
us	with	a	useful	example	of	these	proceedings:	their	constitutional	contract	of	1413	
stipulated	that	the	directors	were	allowed	to	“submit,	order	and	risk	by	sea,	by	land	
and	by	rivers,	one	time	and	many,	merchandise,	investments,	changes	and	any	other	
things,	in	the	way	and	manner	that	they	consider”21.	In	exchange,	they	were	required	
to	render	account	on	their	activities	to	the	rest	of	the	partners	at	the	end	of	the	
accounting	year,	when	proceeds	were	divided	according	to	each	one’s	investments.	
During	the	fifteenth	century	it	became	increasingly	common	for	directors	to	be	paid	a	
salary	or,	less	frequently,	an	additional	share	in	the	profits,	even	if	they	were	already	
involved	in	the	company	as	partners	22.		
			In	the	core	of	the	merchant	business	is	no	doubt	the	inner	circle	of	relatives,	friends	
and	colleges,	as	many	of	our	sources	clearly	suggest.	In	1417,	members	of	the	Bonet	
family	from	Valencia	found	a	company	to	trade	in	Sardinia	and	Sicily,	placing	the	
responsibility	of	carrying	and	trading	the	goods	on	one	of	their	partners.	In	1422,	
members	of	the	Bou	family	along	with	other	merchants	establish	a	company	for	three																																																									
20	Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	p.	138;	Macaire,	Majorque	et	le	
commerce	internationale,	p.	198.	
21	In	the	original:	“trametra,	comanar	e	arriscar	per	mar,	per	terra	e	per	aygues	dals,	una	
vegada	e	moltes,	mercaderies,	esmerços,	cambis	e	totes	altres	coses,	e	en	aquella	forma	e	
manera	que	a	ells	e	a	cascun	d’ells	sera	vist	faedor”	Carrère,	C.	Barcelone,	centre	économique	à	
l’époque	des	difficultés,	pp.	160,	519-520.	
22	Cruselles,	Ibidem,	pp.	103,	138;	Carrère,	Ibidem,	pp.	158-160.	
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years:	their	branch	in	Genoa	will	be	managed	by	a	rotating	director	drawn	from	the	
partners	themselves23.		
			However,	we	should	be	careful	not	to	draw	a	simplistic	picture	of	Valencian	tranding	
networks.	Even	within	the	city	walls	of	Valencia,	operators	came	from	very	
heterogeneous	backgrounds,	what	implied	that	very	often	they	lacked	of	any	personal	
knowledge	or	tie	binding	them	together.	Out	of	the	187	merchants	studied	by	Enrique	
Cruselles	between	1400	and	1450,	only	24	came	from	local	merchant	families.		Many	
others	came	from	convert	and	artisan	backgrounds,	or	had	emigrated	from	smaller	
towns	within	the	Kingdom	of	Valencia,	from	Catalonia,	Mallorca	or	even	Castile	and	
Italy24.	For	instance,	a	wool	weaver	is	found	investing	in	1380	along	two	Valencian	rich	
merchants,	Joan	and	Lluis	Dexarch,	to	trade	in	Granada25.	Likewise,	in	1412	Jaume	Fua	
formed	a	company	with	two	Barcelonan	merchants	recently	settled	in	Valencia,	
Ramon	Puig-Roi	and	Pere	Corbí.	In	order	to	mitigate	risks,	Jaume	was	careful	enough	
to	stipulate	a	clause	that	forbade	the	two	Barcelonans	to	lend	the	company’s	money	
without	the	permit	of	the	other	partners26.		
			At	the	same	time,	Valencian	networks	were	far	beyond	the	jurisdiction	of	their	own	
city.	In	1387,	Francesc	Çatorra	and	Pere	Roig,	Valencians,	establish	a	society	with	
Francesch	de	Montblanch,	Mallorcan,	to	trade	in	Barbaria.	The	Mallorcan	was	even	
agreed	to	settle	in	Oran	to	represent	the	company,	and	was	trusted	much	of	the	firm’s	
total	capital	amount27.	Valencian	merchants	customarily	made	use	of	foreign	
operators	to	carry	their	goods	overseas,	as	shown	in	a	letter	of	May	1414	written	by	
the	aldermen	of	Valencia	and	addressed	to	the	king	of	Fez.	In	such	a	letter,	Nicholau	
de	Montell	is	said	to	have	freighted	two	ships	to	trade	in	North	Africa:	one,	on	charge	
of	Bernat	Gilabert	and	Arnau	Seguer,	Valencian	and	Mallorcan	respectively;	and	a	
second	one	commanded	by	Pero	Juanyes,	“del	regne	de	Castella”,	who	in	turned	
carried	another	of	his	factors,	Johan	Gabella,	citizen	of	Genoa28.	
			These	companyes	mercantivols	were	established	for	short	periods	of	time.	According	
to	the	figures	provided	by	Enrique	Cruselles,	the	average	duration	of	a	Valencian	
society	was	around	two	years29.	Firms	could	last	longer,	yet	four	and	five	years	firms	
were	rather	exceptional.	Nevertheless,	merchants	did	frequently	renew	societies	to	
repeat	operations	and	take	advantage	of	acquired	knowledge	on	partners,	agents	and	
markets.	In	1400,	Ramon	de	Navel,	Johan	Junyent	and	Johan	Ces	Oliveres,	merchants	
from	Barcelona,	establish	a	society	for	three	years	with	branches	in	Montpellier	and	
Valencia.	Once	expired,	it	is	renewed	in	pretty	similar	terms	by	1404,	except	for	the	
fact	that	the	share	of	Ramon	de	Navel	has	diminished30.	In	1403,	fifteen	Christian	
merchants	and	some	Jews	from	Mallorca	found	the	renowned	Algiers	company,	which	
would	be	dissolved	and	re-founded	several	times	until	143831.																																																									
23	Cruselles,	Ibidem,	p.	105.	
24	Ibidem,	p.	99.	25	Cruselles,	E.	‘Jerarquización	y	especialización	de	los	circuitos	mercantiles	valencianos,	finales	
del	XIV-primera	mitad	del	XV’,	p.	95.	
26	Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	p.	107.	
27	Cruselles,	E.	‘Jerarquización	y	especialización	de	los	circuitos	mercantiles	valencianos’,	p.	96.	
28	AMV,	LM,	g3-12,	135r-135v.	
29	Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	p.	103-104.	
30	Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	économique	à	l’époque	des	difficultés,	pp.	163-164.	
31	Macaire,	Majorque	et	le	commerce	internationale,	p.	199.	
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			Beside	companies,	merchants	relied	on	a	wide	array	of	commenda	partners,	factors,	
procurators	and	employees.	We	have	already	seen	several	examples	of	brothers	jointly	
operating	family	ventures;	sons	were	likewise	associated	to	the	family	business	since	
an	early	age,	remaining	under	their	father’s	direction	until	adulthood.	In	1418,	for	
instance,	the	three	factors	employed	by	Mateu	Bondia	to	carry	on	his	business	were	
his	sons	themselves:	Joan,	Lluc	and	Marc,	the	latter	being	sent	to	Italy	to	coordinate	
from	those	parts	the	shipping	and	sale	of	merchandise.	In	1436,	the	elder	son	of	Daniel	
Barceló,	Lluis,	is	sent	to	Flanders	to	represent	the	family	firm.	One	year	later,	Francesc	
Pellicer	gives	powers	of	attorney	to	his	son	Antoni	to	trade	in	Biscay	as	his	factor32.		
			As	stated	before,	business	organisation	goes	beyond	the	tight	circle	of	relatives.	Very	
young	apprentices	were	hired	for	nine,	ten	or	fifteen	years	and	assimilated	to	the	
merchant’s	household	on	the	basis	of	apprenticeship	contracts,	in	a	similar	manner	as	
was	common	in	the	artisan	sector.	Those	arrangements	implied	that	apprentices	lose	
temporarily	their	independence:	they	were	obliged	to	reside	in	a	certain	place	and	to	
work	exclusively	for	their	employees	during	the	stipulated	period.	In	exchange,	they	
were	paid	a	salary.	In	1415	a	peasant	sent	his	son	Gonzalo	to	work	for	the	merchant	
Francesc	Montfort:	the	contract	stipulated	nine	years	of	work.	These	apprentices	were	
frequently	sent	abroad	to	work	as	factors	for	their	masters:	that	is	the	case	of	
Berenguer	Gravalosa,	whom	we	see	in	1423	settling	in	Almeria	on	behalf	of	Francesc	
Çaidia.	Shortly	after,	the	same	Francesc	is	employing	a	second	young	merchant,	
referred	to	in	the	records	as	“juvenem	meum”,	to	trade	in	the	realms	of	Granada.	
Three	years	later	we	found	Berenguer	still	residing	in	the	same	town	and	working	for	
Francesc,	which	gives	us	an	idea	of	the	long-term	trust	relations	that	were	built	up	
around	these	apprenticeship	contracts,	known	as	contractes	d’affermament.		
			Free-lance	merchants	could	also	be	hired	as	factors	and	procurators.	In	1412,	the	
Bou	Brothers	founded	a	company	to	trade	towards	Flanders:	Johan,	merchant,	will	
manage	the	firm’s	undertakings	from	the	Valencian	headquarters,	while	his	brother	
Guerau,	ennobled,	participates	as	an	absent	investor.	A	third	non-family	member,	
Johan	Sallit,	is	trusted	the	business	in	Bruges,	where	he	is	agreed	to	reside	for	3	years	
in	exchange	of	a	hundred	florins	per	year,	plus	his	own	capital	investment	in	the	
company.	A	fourth	non-family	member,	Jaume	Guils,	will	work	as	accountant	for	a	
salary33.	Adult	factors	would	normally	work	for	an	array	of	employers	at	the	same	
time,	being	rewarded	with	salaries	or	commissions	in	pretty	much	the	same	terms	as	
their	Italian	colleges34.	Factors	might	be	given	discretion	to	undertake	commercial	
decisions	on	their	own,	but	principals	increasingly	preferred	to	provide	detailed	
instructions	on	the	goods	to	be	acquired	and	dispatched.	In	June	1425,	the	Junyent	
company	from	Barcelona	hired	Johan	Bonet,	a	Valencian	merchant,	in	the	following	
terms:	the	latter,	in	exchange	of	2400	pounds	per	cargo,	had	to	dispatch	every	month	
one	hundred	pieces	of	cloth	(draps)	from	Valencia	to	Barcelona.	The	contract	even	
stipulated	the	features	that	those	pieces	should	have,	for	they	were	thought	to	be	re-
dispatched	to	Sicily:	“acolorats	de	roba	scura,	prout	est	usaticum	pro	partibus	Sicilie”.	
In	case	an	employer	considered	that	his	agent	had	not	fulfilled	his	contractual																																																									
32	Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	p.	161.	
33	Cruselles,	Ibidem,	pp.	153,	154,	157.	
34	Cruselles,	Ibidem,	p.	168;	Ashtor,	E.,	Levant	Trade	in	the	Later	Middle	Ages	(Princeton,	1983),	
p.	403.	
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obligations,	he	could	turn	to	the	courts.	For	instance,	in	1423	Pere	Portagas,	
Barcelonan,	denounced	his	factor	in	Sicily35.	
			Valencian	businessmen	usually	gave	powers	of	attorney	to	fellow	merchants	in	order	
to	recover	debts	abroad,	undertake	commercial	operations	on	their	behalf,	draw	bills	
of	exchange	or	monitor	the	performance	of	their	factors.	In	1423,	the	aforementioned	
Francesc	Çaidia	appointed	two	Valencian	merchants	residing	in	the	Nasrid	Kingdom	as	
procuratores	to	monitor	Berenguer	Gravalosa,	his	young	factor	in	Almeria.	One	month	
later,	Francesc	would	even	appoint	another	merchant	to	undertake	the	same	auditing	
tasks.	In	1426,	Berenguer	himself	will	be	given	powers	of	attorney	to	claim	some	goods	
and	debts	owed	to	his	master	by	other	factors	and	merchants	settled	in	the	area.	In	
Sardinia,	Valencian	merchants	even	gave	powers	of	attorney	to	local	merchants	to	
manage	their	business	or	claim	debts36.	Like	adult	factors,	these	procurators	could	
work	for	several	merchants	at	the	same	time,	being	rewarded	with	a	fee	or	a	share,	
depending	on	the	nature	of	the	tasks	to	be	accomplished.	Partners	and	trustworthy	
factors	were	usually	given	as	well	these	faculties,	up	to	the	point	that	every	so	often	
notarial	deeds	refer	to	the	latter	as	procuratorem	et	negotiatorem37.	
			Notwithstanding	the	proliferation	of	mercantile	societies,	commenda	contracts	were	
still	commonly	used	in	the	fifteenth	century.	In	the	commerce	with	the	Levant	and	the	
secondary	ports	of	the	Maghreb,	evidence	suggests	that	they	were	even	
proportionately	more	employed38.	An	illustrative	case	might	be	that	of	Martin	Andreu,	
a	sedentary	investor	from	Valencia	who	entrusted	a	thousand	pounds	to	Arnau	
Barcelona,	merchant	from	Tortosa,	to	be	traded	in	the	Maghribi	cities	of	Honein,	One,	
Tlemcen	and	Oran;	the	resulting	purchases	had	to	be	dispatched	the	same	year	of	
1418	to	Mallorca	and	Valencia.	Proceeds	would	be	divided	as	usual:	one	quarter	to	
reward	the	tractator	and	the	other	three	quarters	to	the	capital	investor39.	These	
investors	would	usually	put	their	money	in	several	commenda	ventures,	and	
commenda	travelling	merchants	typically	tried	to	collect	several	commendas	from	a	
base	of	multiple	investors40.		
			Under	certain	circumstances,	commenda	contracts	incorporated	the	formula:	
“smerciare	in	illis	rebus,	raubis	et	mercaturiis	michi	benevisis”,	which	gave	agents	full	
discretion	to	use	the	capitals	they	had	been	entrusted,	yet	this	made	them	liable	of	
audition	by	the	sedentary	partners	once	returned41.	Around	this	time,	however,	
principals	became	growingly	involved	in	purchase	decisions.	In	the	Levant	commerce,	
they	usually	wrote	down	“recordanças”,	that	is,	legally	binding	purchase	orders	that																																																									
35	Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	économique.,	pp.	51,	142.	
36	Villanueva,	Concepción,	‘La	presencia	de	valencianos	y	aragoneses	en	la	documentación	
notarial	cagliaritana	del	siglo	XV’,	Anuario	de	estudios	medievales,	38	(2008),	pp.	38-39.	
37	Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	pp.	155,	156,	159;	Macaire,	op.	cit.,	p.	
200.	
38	Evidence	seemingly	confirms	this	phenomenon	for	the	three	great	Catalan	ports:	see	
Coulon,	Damien.	Barcelone	et	le	grand	commerce	d’Orient	au	Moyen	Age:	un	siècle	de	
relations	avec	l’Égipte	et	la	Syrie-Palestine:	ca.	1330-ca.	1430	(Madrid,	2004),	p.	228,	footnote	
25;	López,	María	Dolores,	La	corona	de	Aragón	y	el	Magreb	en	el	siglo	XV,	1331-1410	
(Barcelona,	1995),	pp.	414-415;	Macaire,	op.	cit.,	p.	209.	
39	Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	p.	151;	Pyror,	John	H.	‘The	Origins	of	
the	Commenda	Contract’,	Speculum,	54,	1	(Jan.	1977),	p.	6;	Carrère,	op.	cit.,	p.	157.	
40	Cruselles,	Ibidem,	p.	136.	
41	Cruselles,	Ibidem,	p.	150.	
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travelling	merchants	had	to	follow.	In	fact,	one	of	the	main	causes	of	conflict	in	
commenda	contracts	was	the	claim	that	travelling	merchants	hadn’t	brought	the	
required	merchandise.	In	1433,	Antoni	Berga	entrusted	Johan	de	Vilaseca	20	jugs	of	
honey	with	the	purpose	of	selling	them	in	the	Levant	and	purchasing	in	return	pepper	
and	baladí	ginger,	to	be	carried	back	to	Barcelona.	Since	Johan	brough	back	maquí	
instead	of	baladí	ginger,	Antoni	sued	him42.		
			It	is	still	debated	to	what	extent	Valencian	merchants	collected	funds	from	a	wide	
base	of	citizen	investors.	In	Barcelona,	urban	upper-middle	classes	have	invested	in	
commerce	since	the	thirteenth	century	through	the	commenda	formula,	by	which	the	
merchant	promised	to	pay	an	interest	after	a	certain	period	of	time.	In	1417,	a	similar	
system	allowed	the	Medici	bank	to	increase	fourfold	its	capital	base.	For	Valencia	we	
have	only	a	few	hints.	In	1380,	Maciana,	widow	of	Ferrer	Mas,	recognised	to	have	
been	paid	500	florins	by	Francesc	Çatorre	and	Bernat	Segarra,	by	reason	of	her	
previous	investment	in	their	society.	In	1418,	Francesc	Pellicer	received	in	commenda	
100	pounds	from	Margarida,	widow	of	Andreu	Ferrer,	promising	to	pay	a	quarter	of	
the	returns43.	In	any	event,	Valencia	was	not	far	from	developing	true	impersonal	
financial	markets	in	which	wide	sectors	of	the	population	could	invest	their	savings,	
including	artisans,	barbers,	surgeons,	lawyers,	widows	and	nobles.	Particularly,	since	
shipbuilding	required	large	investments	and	risk	sharing,	ship	ownership	tended	to	be	
divided	in	a	number	of	shares	called	setzenas	(literally,	sixteenths),	which	could	be	
bought,	sold	and	negotiated	in	the	open	market,	pretty	much	in	the	Barcelonan	
fashion.	Although	shipmasters	customarily	held	near	half	of	a	vessel’s	ownership,	ship	
ownership	was	usually	fragmented	among	a	number	of	shareholders.	Jacqueline	Guiral	
has	contended	that	the	Valencian	setzena	market	was	mainly	in	the	hands	of	the	
nobility	and	the	urban	oligarchy,	yet	her	own	data	show	seamen,	artisans	and	
professionals	accounting	for	the	34%	of	ship	shareholders	in	the	fifteenth	century44.	
			The	size	of	the	Valencian	mercantile	firms	in	this	period	seems	rather	modest.	For	
the	term	between	1350	and	1450	there	are	only	two	sizeable	companies:	the	first	one,	
established	in	1380	by	the	families	Exarch	and	Fernandes,	which	amounted	to	6800	
pounds,	to	be	traded	in	Granada;	and	the	Ros	company,	established	in	1414	by	
members	of	the	Ros	family	and	the	merchant	Ferran	Garcia,	which	raised	6800	
pounds.	According	to	the	available	data,	the	average	duration	of	a	Valencian	firm	was	
1.77	years;	its	average	capital	amount,	1,384	pounds;	and	its	average	number	of	
partners,	2.98.	Only	3	out	of	the	50	firms	studied	by	Enrique	Cruselles	exceeded	the	
3,000	pounds,	and	24	didn’t	reach	to	1,000.	It	is	true	that	companies	were	modest	
even	in	the	most	advanced	cities:	Lucchese	firms	around	1371-1372	had	on	average	2																																																									
42	(Coulon,	Barcelone	et	le	grand	commerce	d’Orient,	p.	605;	Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	
économique,	pp.	645-646;	Cruselles,	Ibidem,	p.	150).	On	the	role	of	Valencians	in	the	Levant	
trade,	either	from	Barcelona	or	from	their	own	port,	see:	Ashtor,	Levant	Trade	in	the	Later	
Middle	Ages,	pp.	140,	198,	232;	Coulon,	Ibidem,	p.	573,	Guiral,	Jacqueline,	Valencia,	puerto	
mediterráneo	en	el	siglo	XV,	pp.	148,	151.	These	“recordanças”	weren’t	anyway	unique	of	the	
Levant	trade:	they	are	recorded	in	Valencian	commerce	with	Italy	and	other	parts,	see	
Cruselles,	Ibidem,	p.	151.		
43	Cruselles,	Ibidem,	pp.	111-112.	
44	Carrère,	C.	Ibidem,	pp.	202-210.	The	setzena	system	was	also	used	in	Mallorca:	see	Cruselles,	
Ibidem,	p.	137;	and	López,	María	Dolores,	La	Corona	de	Aragón	y	el	Magreb,	p.	314.	For	
Valencia,	see	Guiral,	Jacqueline,	Ibidem,	p.	203-204.	
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factors	per	firm;	only	11	employed	more	than	6	persons,	and	businesses	over	10	
employees	were	exceptional	in	Italy45.	Yet	we	do	not	find	in	Valencia	any	firm	
comparable	to	the	Barcelonan	Lobera-Junyent,	established	in	1413	and	lasting	more	
than	80	years,	which	at	its	peak	amounted	to	25,415	pounds46.	Even	for	Mallorca,	
Pierre	Macaire	found	in	1421	two	societies	worth	5,200	and	10,910	pounds47.		
			Despite	all	this,	Valencian	merchant	networks	were	much	wider	and	thicker	than	one	
might	have	expected	in	advance.	Labour	enjoyed	a	high	degree	of	mobility,	as	
merchants	could	work	as	commenda	partners,	factors	and	procurators	for	a	full	array	
of	consolidated	merchant	companies.	On	the	other	side,	investors	could	count	on	a	
wide	set	of	collaborators	to	undertake	their	ventures.	Let	us	think,	for	instance,	in	the	
case	of	a	middle-rank	merchant	as	Francesc	Siurana,	a	changer	who	was	able	to	keep	
business	interests	stretching	from	Atlantic	Spain	to	the	central	Mediterranean	through	
multiple	contractual	arrangements	with	colleges	from	Valencia,	Castellon	and	
Barcelona,	commenda	partners	from	Biscay	and	even	Italian	procurators	and	agents48.	
			In	sum,	Valencian	merchants	made	good	use	of	several	forms	of	business	
organisation.	They	kept	long-term	business	relations	with	relatives	and	well-known	
colleges	in	order	to	attenuate	hazards,	yet	trading	networks	showed	keen	and	capable	
to	assimilate	newcomers	and	enter	into	contracts	with	foreigners,	enabling	Valencian	
merchants	to	successfully	reach	out	far	way	markets.	It	remains	to	be	explained,	
however,	what	means	were	used	to	to	enforce	such	arrangements.	That	is	the	focus	of	
the	following	chapter.	
	
	
I.2.	The	merchants	for	themselves:	the	role	of	
informal	institutions	
	
	
After	having	reviewed	the	mercantile	networks	and	arrangements	used	by	the	
merchants	from	Valencia	around	the	early	fifteenth	century,	most	of	the	contractual	
hazards	they	had	to	deal	with	on	an	ordinary	basis	should	already	be	quite	evident.	
How	could	Berenguer	Gravasola	credibly	commit	ex	ante	not	to	embezzle	Francesc	
Çaidia’s	capital,	taking	into	account	that	he	was	trading	on	his	behalf	from	hundreds	of	
miles	away,	settled	in	a	Muslim	state	wide	beyond	the	jurisdiction	of	Valencia	and	the	
King	of	Aragon?	How	the	Basque	commenda	partners	or	the	Italian	agents	making	
deals	in	the	name	of	Francesc	Siurana	or	Nicholau	de	Montell?	All	these	operators	
might	be	tempted	either	to	embezzle	all	their	principal’s	capital,	hence	never	coming	
back	to	Valencia,	or	to	misreport	trading	profits	in	case	they	chose	to	come	back,	thus	
embezzling	a	part	of	them.																																																									
45	Cruselles,	Ibidem,	pp.	102-146.	
46	This	is,	by	the	way,	not	so	distant	from	the	Datini	or	the	Genoese	and	Lombard	firms	
operating	in	the	same	epoch	(Cruselles,	Ibidem,	pp.	109-110;	Melis,	Federigo,	Aspetti	della	vita	
económica	medievale:	studi	nell’Archivio	Datini	di	Prato	(Siena,	1962),	pp.	305,	330	
47	Macaire,	Majorque	et	le	commerce	international,	pp.	199-200.	
48	Cruselles,	Ibidem,	pp.	165,	167,	236.	
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			A	major	reason	for	this	commitment	problem	was	asymmetric	information:	principals	
could	only	incompletely	monitor	their	agents,	know	how	they	were	performing	or	
what	the	profitability	of	their	overseas	businesses	was.	Even	though	merchants	might	
make	good	use	of	extensive	networks	of	relatives,	friends	and	colleges	to	monitor	their	
agents,	crucial	information	typically	arrived	ex	post	and	quite	late.	A	letter	written	by	
the	aldermen	of	Valencia	on	the	7th	of	September	1416,	addressed	to	the	sultan	of	
Granada,	provides	us	a	valuable	example	of	one	of	these	situations49.	Lluis	de	Eixarchs,	
a	rich	merchant	from	Valencia,	possesses	a	factor	settled	in	the	city	of	Granada	to	look	
after	his	business	in	those	parts.	The	said	factor,	named	Pere	Montblanch,	was	
expected	to	carry	on	the	usual	duties	of	his	position:	selling	cargoes	imported	from	
Valencia,	acquiring	Granadan	silk	and	dispatching	it	back	to	the	firm	headquarters.	
Lluis	seemingly	suspected	that	“instead	of	looking	after	what	he	(the	factor)	have	been	
trusted,	he	did	quite	the	opposite”50,	so	he	sent	one	of	his	sons	to	supervise	on	the	
field	the	running	of	the	business.	What	he	found	was	that	Pere	“had	wasted	and	
concealed	a	great	amount	of	their	goods	and	money”51,	nearly	ruining	the	enterprise.	
Agency	relations	were	undoubtedly	a	source	of	trouble	for	merchants.	But	aside	from	
them,	even	purchase	transactions	might	involve	high	risks,	especially	when	comprising	
the	use	of	financial	tools.	Around	the	same	time,	a	Granadan	merchant	acquired	some	
goods	from	a	Valencian	operator	through	the	drawing	of	a	letter	of	exchange,	to	be	
paid	in	the	Moorish	quarter	of	Valencia	by	one	of	his	partners.	By	the	time	the	
Christian	operator	came	back	in	town	from	Granada	to	claim	his	debt,	the	Moorish	
Valencian	partner	asserted	to	know	nothing	of	that	transaction	and	refused	to	pay	it	
back.	Even	Christian	moneychangers	would	sometimes	answer	with	an	“I	don’t	know	
him”,	“no.l	conech	no	se	qui	es”,	when	presented	a	bill	of	exchange	to	be	redeemed52.	
			Legal	fragmentation	was	certainly	the	other	great	problem	in	relation	to	contract	
enforcement.	As	professor	Gelderblom	puts	it,	how	might	border-crossing	contracts	be	
enforced	if	the	laws	were	local	and	the	jurisdiction	of	the	place	merchants	lived	ended	
at	the	city	gate?53.	This	sole	circumstance	provided	an	opportunity	for	agents	to	
breach	contracts	and	flee	to	foreign	jurisdictions.	In	the	Cervera	Corts	of	1351,	Peter	IV	
of	Aragon	announced	that	moneychangers	that	fled	to	another	town	or	village	after	
going	bankrupt	should	be	beheaded	unless	they	redeemed	their	debts.	This	expedient	
was,	of	course,	only	applicable	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	King54.	In	August	1380,	the	
night	before	the	trial	could	take	place	before	the	consul	of	Fez,	the	debtor	Guillem	
Oliver	run	away	on	horseback	from	the	North	African	town,	seemingly	disappearing55.	
In	the	days	of	the	privative	kingdom	of	Mallorca,	we	know	about	the	case	of	a	cloth-
dealer	named	Francesc	de	Montilano,	whose	commercial	partner,	Federico	Llosa,	fled	
the	island	and	settled	in	Seville,	carrying	with	himself	the	16,000	solidi	jointly	invested	
																																																								
49	The	said	letter	is	AMV,	LM,	g3-13,	153r-v.	
50	In	the	original:	“axi	com	deguera	ben	procurar	e	guardar	ço	que	li	han	comanat,	ha	fet	tot	lo	
contrari”.		
51	“(…)	que	lo	dit	factor	ha	guastats	e	amagats	gran	suma	de	lurs	bens	e	diners”.	
52	Cruselles,	Jerarquización,	p.	97;	Carrère,	op.	cit.,	p.	153,	footnote	3.		
53	Gelderblom,	Oscar,	Cities	of	Commerce,	p.	102.	
54	Carrère,	Ibidem,	p.	35,	footnote	1.	
55	ARM,	AH	4496,	f.	251r-v,	August	1380	(provided	by	Daniel	Duran,	unpublished).	
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in	the	company56.	Unfortunately	we	do	not	know	what	the	outcome	of	this	episode	
was,	but	Federico	probably	thought	he	could	take	advantage	of	the	jurisdictional	
conflicts	that	were	already	common	at	that	time.	In	Almeria,	between	1332	and	1334,	
another	case	stands	out:	that	of	Jacme	Manfré,	a	Mallorcan	merchant,	who	boldly	
stated	before	the	justice	to	be	Genoese	in	order	to	avoid	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Catalan	
consul57.	This	pretension	was	by	no	means	implausible:	back	then	Latin	Mediterranean	
languages	were	near	mutually	comprehensible,	and	jumping	from	one	nation	to	
another	would	have	not	posed	an	insurmountable	challenge	for	merchants	
accustomed	to	deal	with	multi-national	partners58.	Florentine	merchants	that	went	
bankrupt	or	were	sued	for	debts	usually	fled	to	Alexandria	and	Rhodes,	concealing	
their	identity	under	other	nations	flags,	and	it	is	not	implausible	that	Catalan	and	
Valencian	cheaters	might	have	acted	likewise59.	As	the	number	of	traders	and	
communities	increased,	the	cost	of	falsifying	one’s	community	affiliation	dropped,	and	
the	cost	of	verifying	a	merchant’s	identity	increased60.	On	the	other	hand,	several	
evidences	suggest	that	legal	fragmentation	provided	a	favourable	environment	for	
crew	mutinies.	On	the	13th	November	1463,	the	crew	of	a	Valencian	ship	bound	for	
Mostaganem,	North	Africa,	seized	the	vessel,	imprisoned	the	shipmaster	and	set	sail	
for	Cartagena,	a	Castilian	dominion,	at	the	time	at	war	with	Aragon,	where	they	
expected	to	sell	safely	the	robbed	merchandise61.	Seamen	knew	definitely	how	to	take	
advantage	from	political	rifts	between	neighbouring	states.		
			Informal	institutions	constituted	a	first	resort	in	the	merchant	strategies	for	contract	
enforcement.	In	the	first	place,	family	and	kinship	bounded	fellow	relatives	together	
and	encouraged	self-enforcing	standards	of	conduct.	We	have	already	seen	in	the	
previous	chapter	that	most	commercial	ventures	were	assembled	by	fellow	brothers,	
and	that	merchants	preferred	to	use	their	own	sons	as	factors	and	agents	as	much	as	
possible62.	Uncles	could	also	be	given	powers	of	attorney,	as	did	Francesc	de	Magadis,	
Mallorcan	settled	in	Algiers,	with	Ombert	de	Magadis,	in	order	to	recover	debts	and	
robbed	merchandise63.	All	this	certainly	reveals	that	family	had	a	role	in	lowering																																																									
56	Ortega	Villoslada,	A.,	La	marina	mercante	medieval	y	la	Casa	de	Mallorca:	entre	el	
Mediterráneo	y	el	Atlántico	(Lleida,	2015),	p.	102.	
57	This	case	is	extensively	tackled	in	Sánchez,	M.,	‘Mallorquines	y	genoveses	en	Almería	
durante	el	primer	tercio	del	siglo	XIV:	el	proceso	contra	Jaume	Manfré	(1334)’,	Miscel.lània	de	
Textos	Medievals,	4	(1988),	pp.	103-162.		
58	For	instance,	in	fifteenth	century	Alexandria	there	is	evidence	of	Venetian	notaries	drawing	
up	acts	in	Catalan:	see	Apellániz,	Francisco,	‘Judging	the	Franks:	Proof,	Justice,	and	Diversity	in	
Late	Medieval	Alexandria	and	Damascus’,	Comparative	Studies	in	Society	and	History,	58-2	
(2016),	pp.	350-378.	
59	Apellániz,	Francisco,	‘Forentine	networks	in	the	Middle	East	in	the	early	Renaissance’,	
Mediterranean	Historical	Review,	30,	2	(2015),	pp.	125-145.	
60	Greif,	A.	Institutions	and	the	Path	to	the	Modern	Economy,	pp.	338-339.	
61	Guiral,	Jacqueline,	op.	cit.,	pp.	321-322.	Mutinies	failed	their	aims	when	a	Catalan	consulate	
existed	in	any	of	the	ports	of	call,	see	Salicrú,	R.,	‘Notes	sobre	el	consolat	de	Catalans	de	
Siracusa	(1319-1529)’,	XIV	Congreso	di	Storia	della	Corona	d’Aragona	(Sassari-Alghero,	1990),	
p.	706.	
62	Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	pp.	109-110	This	is	also	true	for	many	
contemporary	Italian	companies:	see	Lane,	Frederick,	Venice,	a	maritime	republic	(Baltimore,	
1973),	p.	138.		
63	20th	February,	1385,	ARM	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	23v-24r	(Daniel	Duran,	unpublished).	
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transaction	costs	and	enforcing	contracts,	yet	its	role	was	limited.	This	is	due	to	two	
reasons.	In	the	first	place,	because	the	array	of	partners,	investors,	factors	and	
employees	clearly	transcended	the	restricted	circle	of	relatives.	On	the	other	hand,	
because	we	know	about	all	these	family	ventures	precisely	because	they	were	
recorded	before	a	public	notary,	what	means	that	they	could	be	used	as	legal	proof	in	
case	of	conflict.	
			Historiography	has	pointed	sometimes	at	Catalan	comradeship	as	a	second	force	that	
might	have	bounded	fellow	nationals	together,	thus	providing	a	contract	enforcement	
mechanism	beyond	family	circles.64	This	“Catalan	commonwealth”	based	on	shared	
language	and	culture	surely	provided	a	ready-made	network	for	Valencians	entering	
into	contracts	with	fellow	connationals	from	the	Principality	and	Mallorca	in	regions	as	
Sicily,	Sardinia,	Barbaria,	Flanders	and	others	in	which	long-standing	Catalan	merchant	
communities	existed65.	They	provided	the	first	contacts,	insured	each	other	cargoes,	
helped	recovering	debts	and	settled	conflicts	with	fellow	merchants	in	amicable	
terms66.	However,	this	mechanism	cannot	account	for	Valencian	mercantile	
arrangements,	and	was	by	all	means	inadequate	to	sustain	complex	transacting.	In	
reality,	merchants	used	their	Catalan	affiliation	quite	opportunistically.	Mallorcan	
merchants	would	deny	Catalan	nationality	when	convenient	to	their	individual	
interest,	as	we	have	already	seen.	In	the	fifteenth	century	they	are	still	found	resisting	
the	jurisdiction	of	the	Catalan	consul	in	Bruges,	and	in	1434	the	Queen	of	Aragon	
herself	had	to	write	the	aldermen	of	Bruges	to	help	the	Catalan	consul	collecting	the	
periatge	tax67.	On	the	other	hand,	Valencian	merchants	strongly	refused	to	contribute	
money	for	the	ransom	of	Barcelonan	citizens	in	the	Levant,	and	Barcelonans	seem	to	
have	done	likewise	when	Valencians	were	the	ones	to	be	rescued	in	Granada68.		
																																																								
64	It	should	be	noted	that	the	“Catalan	commonwealth”	included	people	from	the	three	
Catalan-speaking	countries:	proper	Catalonia,	Valencia	and	Mallorca,	even	though	each	of	
them	was	a	distinctive	principality	or	kingdom.	Mallorca	had	even	a	record	as	a	kingdom	
independent	from	the	Aragonese	monarchy	before	1343.	See	Vela,	Epistolari	de	la	València	
medieval,	pp.	177-188.		
65	Abulafia,	David,	‘Catalan	Merchants	and	the	Western	Mediterranean,	1236-1300:	Studies	in	
the	Notarial	Acts	of	Barcelona	and	Sicily’,	in	Viator,	1	(1985),	pp.	209-242;	López,	María	
Dolores,	‘La	circulación	de	las	élites	económicas	en	el	Mediterráneo	occidental	medieval:	el	
Magreb	como	polo	de	atracción	de	los	mercaderes	catalanoaragoneses’,	Acta	historica	et	
archaeological	mediaevalia,	22	(2001),	pp.	721-734.	
66	Igual,	Luis.	‘Los	grupos	mercantiles	y	la	expansión	política	de	la	Corona	de	Aragón:	nuevas	
perspectivas’,	in	Tanzini	L.,	and	Tognetti,	S.	(eds.),	Il	governo	dell’economia:	Italia	e	Penisola	
Iberica	nel	basso	Medioevo	(Rome,	2014),	p.	22;	Cruselles,	Jerarquización,	pp.	97-98;	Soldani,	
M.	E.	‘Madurs	consellers	o	males	suggestions?	Forme	di	patrocinio,	consulenza	e	consiglio	
nelle	cause	tra	mercanti	a	Barcellona	(secc.	XIV-XV)’,	in	Charageat,	M.,	and	Leveleux-Teixeira,	
C.	(ed.),	Consulter,	juger,	décider:	Le	role	de	l’avis	dans	le	processus	décisionnel	médiéval	
(Madrid,	2007).	
67	Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	économique.,	p.	116.		
68	This	is	clearly	stated	in	a	letter	composed	by	the	Council	of	Valencia	and	addressed	to	her	
messenger	in	1400.	In	it,	the	aldermen	complain	about	the	taxes	collected	from	Valencian	
merchants	in	Beirut	by	the	consol	de	Barchinona.	The	goal	of	those	taxes,	it	is	said,	was	to	
release	some	Barcelonan	captives:	Valencia	counter-argues	that	Valencian	merchants	trading	
in	Granada	paid	alone	for	this	kind	of	expenses.	See	AMV,	LM,	g3-5,	130	r-v.	
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			A	third,	hybrid	explanation	is	that	merchants	carefully	built	networks	of	relatives,	
friends	and	rather	conational	colleagues,	and	then	used	social	sanctions	to	discipline	
them,	mainly	through	ostracism.	When	parties	to	exchange	are	involved	in	repeated	
dealings	and	dense	social	networks	allow	people	to	have	an	intimate	understanding	of	
each	other,	these	private-order	reputation	based	systems	could	provide	the	
background	for	long	distance	trade69.	Enrique	Cruselles	has	similarly	proposed	that	
what	enabled	merchants	to	commit	not	to	breach	contracts	was	the	expectancy	of	
future	dealings	with	an	stable	network	of	merchants.	This	would	seemingly	explain,	for	
instance,	the	fact	that	social	ties	and	patrimonial	wealth	were	very	much	taken	into	
account	when	looking	for	business	partners.	In	fact,	when	merchants	dealt	with	
relatively	unknown	partners,	they	tried	to	take	several	kinds	of	contractual	
precautions,	as	revealed	by	the	following	example.	In	January	1416,	Antoni	Garriga	and	
Francesc	Siruana,	Valencian	rich	merchants,	establish	a	company	with	two	Barcelonan	
merchants	recently	settled	in	the	city,	Ramon	Puig-Roi	and	Pere	Corbi.	Since	these	two	
newcomers	are	only	scarcely	known	among	the	Valencian	trading	networks,	they	are	
contractually	restricted	the	amount	of	goods	they	can	trade	at	a	certain	period.	Even	
more,	their	wives’	property	is	held	liable	in	case	they	die70.	Bills,	pledges	and	
guarantors	could	be	used	as	well	in	these	cases:	in	late	fifteenth	century,	the	Forentine	
naturalized	Valencian	Joan	del	Vinyo,	merchant,	acts	as	guarantor	on	behalf	of	Martín	
Ochoa	de	Bassara,	Biscayan,	before	his	creditor,	a	Spannochi	factor	who	lent	him	
money	to	travel	to	Naples71.	The	existence	of	these	informal	merchant	coalitions	
would	explain	as	well	why	merchants	were	so	keen	to	reach	amicable	settlements	with	
their	fellow,	even	if	they	were	owed	a	sizable	amount	of	money:	their	priority	was	not	
to	break	up	relations	but	to	ensure	future	dealings	with	the	same	circle	of	partners.	
Having	a	record	of	honourable	reputation	ensured	them	to	take	advantage	of	these	
networks	in	case	they	needed	procurators,	insurers,	arbiters	or	even	setzena	investors	
to	undertake	the	building	of	new	vessels.	It	is	interesting	to	mention	here	a	revealing	
clause	contained	in	the	Book	of	the	Consulate	of	the	Sea.	In	case	the	building	of	a	ship	
required	more	capital	investment	than	expected,	it	says,	stakeholders	cannot	be	
compelled	to	acquire	more	than	one	setzena,	since	their	investment	is	probably	
motivated	more	by	friendship	than	profit	seeking72.	In	any	case,	these	coalitions	alone	
were	inadequate	to	support	trading	networks	as	those	we	saw	in	the	first	chapter.	
			In	brief,	contractual	hazards	were	a	major	concern	influencing	the	way	Valencian	
merchants	conducted	their	businesses.	In	order	to	attenuate	risks	of	embezzlement	
and	misreport,	they	preferably	dealt	with	fellow	relatives	and	citizens,	connationals	
and	long-term	colleagues.	The	ordinary	demands	of	their	trade	impelled	them	to	
engage	in	loose	merchant	coalitions	that	provided	a	full	set	of	services	(reciprocal	
insurance	and	ship	investing,	juridical	support,	market	information,	trading	partners),	
which	in	turn	made	the	threat	of	exclusion	a	credible	means	to	enable	agents	to																																																									
69	North,	D.	C.	Institutions,	institutional	change	and	economic	performance	(Cambridge,	1990),	
p.	55;	Gelderblom,	Cities	of	Commerce,	p.	103.		
70	Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	pp.	107-108,	148-149.	
71	Guiral,	Ibidem,	p.	279.	
72	Soldani,	‘Madurs	consellers	o	males	suggestions?’,	p.	126;	Coulon,	Ibidem,	p.	600-602;	
Guiral,	Jacqueline,	Valence,	port	méditerranéen	au	XVe	siècle,	1410-1525	(Paris,	1986),	pp.	
140-141.	
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commit	to	their	contracts.	Such	private	order	solutions,	however,	faced	serious	limits	
to	support	trading	networks	as	those	we	saw	in	the	first	chapter,	and	should	be	
regarded	only	as	a	first	resort	in	the	contract	enforcement	mechanisms	that	prevailed	
in	fifteenth	century	Valencia.	We	should	emphasize	that	the	city	proved	to	be	
considerably	effective	at	assimilating	parvenus	and	dealing	with	foreigners,	and	that	
most	of	the	contracts	did	not	imply	the	use	of	guarantors,	bills	or	pledges.	Moreover,	
informal	coalitions	could	not	effectively	prevent	contract	breaches,	for	merchants	
could	always	flee	or	trade	between	multiple	loose	coalitions.	Formal	institutions	had	
necessarily	to	complement	them.	
	
Part	II.	Formal	institutions	and	contract	
enforcement	
	
In	this	part	of	our	paper	we	will	turn	our	attention	to	the	role	of	public	order	
institutions	in	providing	contract	enforcement.	We	will	do	so	from	several	separate	
angles,	each	one	roughly	corresponding	with	a	section.	The	main	body	of	this	part	is	
devoted	to	tackle	the	perspective	of	the	local	merchant	community	and	the	problems	
of	inter-Catalan	and	cross-national	enforcement,	yet	much	space	is	also	devoted	to	the	
distinctive	approach	developed	by	the	merchants	of	Valencia	when	dealing	with	their	
sphere	of	influence,	Granada	and	Barbaria.	As	a	matter	of	course,	this	will	lead	us	to	
the	undertakings	of	the	municipal,	royal	and	consular	institutions,	as	we	will	shall	the	
opportunity	to	see.	Further	space	is	devoted	in	the	last	section	to	compare	the	
Valencian	case	with	neighbouring	experiences:	namely,	Barcelona,	Genoa,	Venice	and	
Florence.	
	
	
II.1.	The	city	of	Valencia,	her	Consolat	de	Mar	and	
the	overseas	consulates	
	
	
Valencia	and	her	Consolat	de	Mar	
	
	
The	Consulate	of	the	Sea	was	basically	a	merchant	court	devoted	to	settle	maritime	
disputes	arising	among	seamen,	merchants	and	investors	in	their	ordinary	
undertakings.	The	first	Consulate	within	the	Crown	of	Aragon	was	granted	by	Royal	
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privilege	to	the	city	of	Barcelona	in	1279;	Valencia	would	follow	in	128373.	By	the	early	
fifteenth	century,	the	definite	features	of	the	court	were	already	well	defined:	it	was	
made	up	of	two	consuls	and	one	judge	of	appeal,	elected	every	Christmas	by	the	local	
seamen	and	merchants74,	and	its	jurisdiction	extended	over	all	maritime	affairs.	The	
Book	of	the	Consulate	of	the	Sea	explicitly	stated	that	the	consuls	exerted	jurisdiction	
over	all	questions	concerning	frights,	damaged	cargoes,	seamen’s	salaries,	auctions,	
shipbuilding,	commendas	and	“in	general	over	all	contracts	that	need	to	be	settled	
according	to	the	usages	and	customs	of	the	sea”75.	A	letter	submitted	in	1356	by	the	
Valencian	consulate	even	suggested	that	Muslim	and	Jewish	connationals	were	also	
subject	to	its	jurisdiction76.	
			The	Book	of	the	Consulate	of	the	Sea,	by	standardizing	the	mercantile	customs,	
provided	a	predictable	framework	in	which	operators	could	anticipate	their	own	legal	
rights	and	liabilities.	In	particular,	the	Book	devoted	lengthy	space	to	define	principal-
agent	relations	in	order	to	mitigate	opportunistic	behaviours.	For	instance,	the	articles	
number	163,	219	and	220	state	that	every	shipmaster	is	obliged	to	submit	dividends	
and	render	account	to	the	shipowners	at	the	end	of	each	voyage.	In	case	the	vessel	
goes	lost	or	damaged,	the	shipmaster	is	obliged	to	submit	the	earnings	made	in	
previous	voyages,	in	case	they	had	not	been	submitted	yet.	This	article,	the	Book	
confesses,	was	made	to	avoid	that	shipmasters	could	delay	the	shipment	of	earnings	
until	their	vessels	were	seriously	damaged,	at	which	point	they	might	contend	that	
everything	had	been	lost	and	proceeds	were	non-existent77.	A	major	reason	to	
establish	such	a	court	was	to	provide	swift	and	clear	procedures	to	settle	mercantile	
affairs:	for	that	matter,	its	verdicts	were	non	appealable	and	its	jurisdiction	was	
exempted	from	municipal	or	royal	intervention78.		
			The	Consolat	de	Mar	provided	contract	enforcement	beyond	the	city	walls	of	
Valencia.	Since	it	was	the	only	consulate	in	the	kingdom,	all	maritime	affairs	
concerning	other	coastal	towns	had	to	be	referred	to	its	tribunal,	making	inter-
Valencian	businesses	reasonably	secure.	The	Book	of	the	Consulate	even	envisaged	the	
possibility	that	consuls	could	impound	debtors’	movable	and	immovable	property	in	
case	they	failed	to	fulfil	their	contractual	obligations,	providing	further	incentives	to	
submit	to	their	jurisdiction79.	Through	a	letter	issued	on	the	20th	of	September	1414	
we	know	of	a	citizen	of	Alicante,	Pasqual	Guardiola,	who	had	been	sued	before	the																																																									
73	Ferrer	i	Mallol,	M.	T.,	‘El	consolat	de	mar	i	els	consolats	d’ultramar,	instrument	i	
manifestació	de	l’expansió	del	comerç	català’,	p.	61.	
74	The	fact	that	the	Valencian	consulate	was	self-managed	by	the	seamen	and	the	merchants,	
instead	of	being	controlled	by	the	Council	as	were	the	Barcelonan	and	Mallorcan	consulates,	
seemingly	explains	why	it	did	not	experience	a	process	of	jurisdictional	expansion	as	did	the	
latter	(Duran	i	Duelt,	D.	‘Consolats	de	mar	i	consolats	d’ultramar:	la	defensa	de	l’espai	marítim	
en	temps	de	Martí	l’Humà’,	p.	78).	
75	Ferrando,	A.	Llibre	del	consolat	de	mar,	articles	20	and	29.	
76	Ibidem,	document	XV,	p.	256.	
77	Ibidem,	articles	163,	219,	220.	This	was	common	usage	in	the	Mediterranean,	and	by	the	
fifteenth	century	it	was	already	introduced	in	the	Low	Countries.	In	1413,	the	Amsterdam	
keurboek	stipulated	the	obligation	of	shipmasters	to	keep	record	of	transactions	and	submit	
periodical	report	to	the	shipowners	(Gelderblom,	Cities	of	Commerce,	p.	94).	78	Narbona,	Rafael,	‘Valencia,	emporio	mediterráneo:	ss.	XIV-XV’,	pp.	105,	108;	Soldani,	
‘Madurs	consellers	o	males	suggestions?’,	pp.	141-142.	
79	Ferrando,	Ibidem,	article	27,	p.	17.	
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court	of	the	Valencian	consuls.	When	the	said	Pasqual	tried	to	deflect	the	process	to	
the	court	of	the	royal	bailiff	in	Alicante,	the	Consulate	of	the	Sea	and	the	aldermen	of	
Valencia	sent	to	the	royal	bailiffs	several	letters	in	which	they	boldly	stood	for	the	
consular	prevalence	over	the	whole	kingdom	and	condemned	the	bailiff’s	proceedings	
as	a	violation	of	the	Consulate’s	privileges.	As	the	aldermen	of	Valencia	stated,	their	
consuls	“have	a	knowledge	on	all	the	maritime	affairs	and	businesses,	not	only	
regarding	the	said	city	but	also	the	whole	kingdom”	80.		
			Albeit	the	consulate	provided	a	last	resort,	merchants	showed	reluctant	to	go	to	
court	because	of	the	time	it	took	and	the	uncertainty	of	the	outcome,	and	typically	
preferred	to	settle	conflicts	amicably	among	themselves	through	arbitration.	For	
instance,	in	1438,	Daniel	Barceló,	citizen	of	Valencia,	and	Pere	d’Odena,	Valencian	
settled	in	Mallorca,	appointed	a	pair	of	arbiters	to	render	justice	regarding	some	
commenda	contracts	and	debts81.	Similar	arrangements	are	well	known	and	were	well	
widespread:	they	had	legal	recognition	and	were	legally	binding,	what	made	them	
credible	alternatives	to	formal	courts82.	
	
	
	
Settling	conflicts	between	fellow	Catalans	
	
	
Mallorcans	and	proper	Catalans	held	no	more	privileges	before	the	court	of	the	
Valencian	consuls	than	did	Genoese	or	Venetian	merchants:	both	groups	were,	in	a	
sense,	foreigners.	However,	non-Valencian	Catalans	lacked	distinctive	consular	
representation	in	the	city,	for	they	were	bound	together	with	Valencian	merchants	by	
a	common	legal	tradition,	a	shared	monarchy	and	an	extensive	consular	network	both	
in	their	Spanish	territories	and	overseas.		
			Mallorcans	and	proper	Catalans	typically	turned	to	the	Valencian	Consulate	to	bring	
legal	charges	against	Valencian	citizens.	In	march	1356,	Garsia	Rosanes,	Barcelonan,	in	
representation	of	other	four	fellow	Barcelonan	merchants,	turned	to	the	court	of	the	
Valencian	consuls	to	denounce	Domingo	Roures,	a	Valencian	corsair	that	had	recently	
seized	a	Castilian	ship	carrying	goods	property	of	the	said	merchants83.		
			The	incentives	involved	in	inter-Catalan	institutional	cooperation	are	clearly	
illustrated	by	the	aforementioned	case	of	Pasqual	Guardiola.	In	1414,	the	said	Pasqual	
seemingly	could	not	reach	an	amicable	settlement	over	an	unspecified	issue	with	
Johan	Peres,	citizen	of	Barcelona.	Since	“the	offended	party	can	choose	the	judge	that	
better	suits	him,	and	by	reason	of	this	the	said	Johan	Peres	chose	the	said	consuls”	of	
Valencia,	Pasqual	Guardiola	was	required	to	give	testimony	before	them.	In	case	he																																																									
80	In	the	original:	“Quels	dits	consols	han	juhi	e	conexença	de	tots	los	feyts	e	negocis	maritims	
no	solament	dela	dita	ciutat	mas	de	tot	lo	regne”.	AMV,	LM	g3-12,	48v-49r.		
81	Cruselles,	Los	comerciales	valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	p.	149,	footnote	12.	
82	Actually,	commercial	disputes	could	be	addressed	through	various	institutions.	Many	
attorney	documents	include	expressions	as:	“coram	consulibus	maritimis,	vicariis,	baiulis	et	
officialibus”	and	the	like	(Duran,	‘Consolats	de	mar	i	consolats	d’ultramar:	la	defensa	de	l’espai	
marítim	en	temps	de	Martí	l’Humà’,	pp.	580-581,	footnote	41).	
83	Ferrando,	Ibidem,	document	XV,	p.	255.	
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would	not	attend	and	justice	could	not	be	administered	—the	aldermen	of	Valencia	
said	to	the	royal	bailiff—,	the	city	of	Barcelona	might	issue	letters	of	marks	or	raise	an	
extraordinary	tax	against	Valencian	commerce	to	make	up	for	the	losses.	On	the	
surface,	the	Council	of	Valencia	was	apparently	motivated	to	settle	the	conflict	on	
behalf	of	the	“good	friendship	of	ours	and	that	city	(of	Barcelona)”,	yet	a	closer	look	
reveals	that	the	incentives	that	encouraged	Valencian	mercantile	institutions	to	
cooperate	with	non-Valencian	citizens	were	the	same	for	Catalans	and	non-Catalans:	
the	threat	of	taking	reprisals	against	the	property	of	their	own	citizens	abroad84.	
	
	
The	consular	network	of	information	and	punishment	
	
	
So	far	we	have	dealt	with	contract	enforcement	within	the	city	and	kingdom	of	
Valencia,	whether	involving	its	own	citizens	or	fellow	Catalans.	Valencian	merchants,	
however,	entered	into	crossing	border	contracts	that	stretched	from	Flanders	to	the	
Levant,	therefore	requiring	an	enforcement	mechanism	wide	beyond	the	jurisdiction	
of	their	own	local	Consulate.	Even	if	businessmen	chose	to	conduct	their	overseas	
affairs	preferably	through	fellow	citizens	and	connationals,	they	required	a	way	to	
monitor	partners,	factors	and	employees,	uncover	contract	breaches	and	punish	the	
infringers85.	
			The	Catalan	consular	network	provided	such	a	mechanism.	By	privilege	granted	by	
James	I	in	1268,	the	Council	of	Barcelona	held	the	privilege	of	appointing	consuls	
d’ultramar	and	commanding	the	whole	network.	The	council	of	Barcelona	and	the	king	
typically	obtained	from	foreign	authorities	the	granting	of	consular	jurisdiction	in	their	
territories,	so	allowing	consuls	to	adjudicate	disputes	according	to	the	laws	and	
customs	of	the	Catalans86.	Indeed,	these	consuls	exerted	jurisdiction	over	all	the	
Spanish	subjects	of	the	king	of	Aragon,	including	the	principality	of	Catalonia	and	the	
kingdoms	of	Valencia,	Mallorca	and	inland	Aragon87.	Consulates	bore	a	double	
function:	on	the	one	hand,	they	fulfilled	the	role	of	a	tribunal	and	administrator	for	the	
Catalans;	on	the	other,	they	served	to	defend	the	rights	and	privileges	of	the	Catalans	
before	the	local	rulers.	Once	a	ship	landed	in	a	port	provided	with	a	consulate,	on	
board	scribes	were	required	to	present	their	logbooks	before	the	consuls,	who																																																									
84	AMV,	LM	g3-12,	48v-49r.	85	González	de	Lara,	Y.	‘The	secret	of	Venetian	success’,	pp.	269-270.	
86	Gelderblom,	Cities	of	Commerce,	pp.	109-110.		
87	Duran	i	Duelt,	Daniel,	‘Monarquia,	consellers	i	mercaders.	Conflictivitat	en	el	consolat	català	
de	Constantinoble	a	la	primera	meitat	del	segle	XV’,	in	Ferrer	i	Mallol,	M.	T.,	and	Coulon,	D.	
(eds.),	L’expansió	catalana	a	la	Mediterrània	a	la	Baixa	Edat	Mitjana	(Barcelona,	1999),	p.	27;	
Ferrer	i	Mallol,	M.	T.,	‘El	consolat	de	mar	i	els	consolats	d’ultramar,	instrument	i	manifestació	
de	l’expansió	del	comerç	català’;	Duran	i	Duelt,	D.	‘La	fi	del	sistema	consular	mallorquí	i	les	
seves	repercussions	en	el	català:	el	cas	dels	consolats	de	Pera	i	Constantinoble’;	Rohne,	C.	F.	
The	origins	and	development	of	the	catalán	consulados	ultramarinos,	pp.	62-117.	The	
Barcelonan	consulates	intended	jurisdiction	as	well	over	Sardinians,	Sicilians	and	eventually	
Napolitans,	but	never	achieved	it	in	face	of	the	resistance	of	these	mercantile	nationes	
(Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	économique.,	p.	119).			
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checked	and	recorded	the	merchandise	to	be	discharged,	its	price	and	the	passengers	
identity,	in	a	similar	manner	as	did	the	port	officials	in	the	mainland	Aragonese	cities88.	
In	case	a	debtor	was	detected,	or	found	guilty	of	any	contractual	breach	while	staying	
in	the	city	which	he	could	not	recover,	the	consuls	were	enabled	to	send	him	and	his	
goods	back	to	the	Aragonese	mainland	carrying	a	cartulary	recording	the	whole	
proceedings.	If	the	offender	refused	to	leave,	the	consuls	were	enabled	to	confiscate	
his	merchandise	while	waiting	orders	from	the	local	authorities89.	
	
			For	this	whole	network	to	work	properly,	mainland	Consulates,	city	councils	and	
Royal	officials	had	to	cooperate	closely	with	the	overseas	consulates90,	since	written	
proof,	witness	testimonies	and	general	information	had	to	be	constantly	transmitted	
from	one	institution	to	the	others	in	order	to	settle	complex	commercial	disputes91.	In	
March	1373,	the	Royal	governor	of	Mallorca,	Olfo	de	Proixita,	submitted	a	letter	to	
Francesc	de	Magadins,	Catalan	consul	in	the	Maghribi	port	of	Bougie,	asking	for	his	
help	in	a	case	of	robbery.	Bernat	Ripoll,	citizen	of	Mallorca,	had	taken	some	dobles	
from	a	chest	belonging	to	Francesc	de	Montblanch,	former	factor	of	his	uncle	Romeu,	
on	the	pretext	that	the	said	dobles	had	been	stolen	from	him	before	by	Macià	d’Orcha.	
On	the	contrary,	Romeu	Rigolf	stated	that	the	said	Macià	had	given	away	those	coins	
in	Bougie,	saying	they	did	not	belong	to	him.	In	order	to	deliver	justice,	Olfo	de	Proixita	
requested	the	consul	of	Bougie	to	take	testimony	of	witnesses	and	submit	to	Mallorca	
any	information	that	might	hep	clearing	up	the	case92.		
			Consulates	displayed	also	useful	as	a	means	to	discipline	sailors	and	discourage	
mutinies.	We	have	already	seen	in	a	previous	chapter	that	seamen	took	advantage	of	
political	rivalries	to	seize	vessels	and	sell	their	cargoes	in	enemy	ports	—otherwise,	
they	would	be	punished.	That	was	the	case	of	a	ship	crew	that	dropped	their	
shipmaster	in	Tripoli	and	set	sail	for	Syracuse.	Since	the	Sicilian	port	already	counted	
with	a	Catalan	consul,	they	were	easily	identified,	judged	and	punished93.	Sometimes,	
the	city	councils	themselves	might	make	use	of	this	information	network	to	find	
offenders	and	safeguard	their	own	citizens.	In	September	1403	we	know	that	the	ship	
of	Christofol	Caruo,	citizen	of	Genoa,	who	had	set	sail	from	Valencia	bound	for	the	
Ligurian	port,	was	seized	by	a	Castilian	corsair	near	the	gulf	of	Lion.	The	consuls	of	
Valencia,	aware	that	among	the	seized	cargo	were	merchandise	and	investments	
belonging	to	fellow	citizens,	wrote	to	the	Catalan	consulates	of	Marseilles,	Alghero	and	
																																																								
88	Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	économique.,	pp.	71,	118;	Guiral,	Valencia,	puerto	mediterráneo,	
p.	221.	
89	Carrère,	Ibidem,	pp.	119-120.	
90	This	is	not	to	say	that	several	kinds	of	conflicts	did	not	arise	around	their	respective	
jurisdiction.	In	the	fifteenth	century	we	find	especially	two	prominent	cases	in	Constantinople	
and	Bruges:	see	Duran	i	Duelt,	Daniel,	‘Monarquia,	consellers	i	mercaders’;	Carrère,	Ibidem,	p.	
116.	
91	With	respect	to	that	it	certainly	helped	that	merchants	were	required	to	keep	record	of	
transactions	in	accountbooks,	so	they	could	be	presented	as	legal	proof	(Cruselles,	Los	
comerciantes	valencianos	en	el	siglo	XV,	p.	217).	
92	ARM,	AH	39,	f.	86v-87r	(unpublished,	Daniel	Duran).	
93	Ferrer	i	Mallol,	M.	T.,	‘El	consolat	de	mar	i	els	consolats	d’ultramar,	instrument	i	
manifestació	de	l’expansió	del	comerç	català’,	pp.	74-75.	
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Cagliari	reporting	the	event	and	providing	official	evidence	on	the	kind	and	quantity	of	
the	merchandise,	to	be	returned	in	case	the	corsair	would	be	captured94.	
	
	
The	Catalano-Aragonese	citizenship:	a	valuable	asset?	
	
	
In	order	for	a	principal	to	enter	into	an	exchange	relationship,	he	needs	to	believe	ex	
ante	that	his	partner	will	fulfil	his	contractual	obligations	ex	post,	when	he	can	gain	
from	reneging.	A	consular	network	that	provides	information	to	detect	contract	
breaches	and	punish	offenders	did	help	in	that	matter,	but	needed	further	
reinforcement.	An	agent	who	traded	with	someone	else’s	capital	could	still	easily	
disappear	with	the	loot	and	flee	to	another	jurisdiction,	away	from	the	authority	of	the	
Catalan	consuls.	In	the	fifteenth	century	even	the	powerful	Medici	bank	stopped	
lending	money	to	the	German	merchants	lodged	in	the	Fondaco	dei	Tedeschi,	for	once	
they	had	come	back	to	Germany	recovering	their	debts	was	nearly	impossible95.	The	
examples	provided	in	previous	chapters	should	suffice	to	grasp	how	pressing	were	
these	legal	fragmentation	problems,	also	in	the	Catalan-Aragonese	world.	Indeed,	the	
ultimate	problem	was	how	to	enable	agents	to	commit	ex	ante	not	to	flee	with	the	
principal’s	capital	ex	post,	even	though	they	could	not	be	punished	if	they	did	it96.	
			A	plausible	hypothesis	is	that	the	Catalan-Aragonese	citizenship	was	so	valuable	in	
the	context	of	the	late	Medieval	Mediterranean	that	merchants	were	motivated	to	
submit	to	Catalan-Aragonese	authorities	instead	of	fleeing	to	a	foreign	jurisdiction	or	
to	falsify	their	own	nationality97.	In	particular,	Catalan-Aragonese	affiliation	was	a	
valuable	asset	thanks	to	a	set	of	overseas	commercial	privileges	that	were	unmatched	
by	any	other	trading	nation	apart	from	the	Genoese	and	the	Venetians.	A	powerful	
monarchy	capable	to	defend	overseas	interests	and	coordinate	the	merchants	
collective	actions	to	discipline	foreign	rulers	further	reinforced	the	attractiveness	of	
Catalan-Aragonese	affiliation	compared	with	smaller	or	less	coordinated	nations98.	In	
1288,	two	years	after	the	Aragonese	conquest,	the	Catalans	received	in	Sicily	rights	
and	tax	exemptions	on	a	pair	with	those	of	the	Genoese,	a	position	further																																																									
94	LM	8,	f.	31	r.	(available	at	Rubio,	A.	Epistolari	de	la	València	medieval,	p.	179.).		
95	Constable,	O.	Housing	the	Stranger,	p.	320.	
96	Greif,	A.	‘Coercion	and	exchange:	How	did	markets	evolve?’,	pp.	10-11;	Greif,	Avner,	‘The	
fundamental	problem	of	exchange’,	p.	265.	
97	González	de	Lara,	‘The	Secret	of	Venetian	success’,	p.	16.	I	have	to	express	my	gratitude	to	
Yadira	González	here,	for	this	section	has	greatly	benefited	from	personal	discussion	with	her.	
98	For	a	discussion	on	this	matter,	see:	Grafe,	R.,	and	Gelderblom,	O.	‘The	Rise	and	Fall	of	the	
Merchant	Guilds:	Re-thinking	the	Comparative	Study	of	Commercial	Institutions	in	Premodern	
Europe’,	Journal	of	Interdisciplinary	History,	XL:	4	(Spring,	2010);	Greif,	‘The	fundamental	
problem	of	exchange’,	pp.	264-265.	The	role	of	the	Crown	in	the	development	of	Catalan	
commerce	is	an	old	historiographical	debate,	but	has	never	been	placed	in	relation	to	contract	
enforcement:	see	Del	Treppo,	M.	‘L’espansione	catalano-aragonese	nel	Mediterraneo’,	in	
Nuove	questioni	di	storia	medievale	(Milano,	1964),	pp.	250-300;	Hillgarth,	J.	N.	The	problem	of	
a	Catalan	Mediterranean	empire,	1229-1327	(London,	1975);	Igual,	Luis.	‘Los	grupos	
mercantiles	y	la	expansión	política	de	la	Corona	de	Aragón:	nuevas	perspectivas’.	
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consolidated	in	the	early	fifteenth	century	after	the	Reconquest	of	the	island,	when	
the	Catalan	share	of	the	cloth	market	rose	from	less	than	ten	per	cent	to	nearly	
seventy	per	cent	in	a	few	years.	After	the	conquest	of	Sardinia	(1323-1326),	Catalans	
would	also	receive	freedom	from	custom	dues99.	By	the	early	fifteenth	century,	a	
Catalan	merchant	would	enjoy	privileged	treatment	along	the	crucial	route	of	the	isles	
from	Valencia	and	Barcelona	to	Mallorca,	Sardinia	and	Sicily,	plus	a	growing	influence	
in	the	government	of	Rhodes	—a	route	known	by	historians	as	the	“Catalan	
diagonal”—100.	Even	the	faraway	and	typically	unsettled	Catalan	consulate	of	Bruges	
enjoyed	a	relatively	privileged	status	and	benefited	from	the	influence	of	the	
Aragonese	king.	Let	us	see	an	example	of	this	coordinating	function	of	the	Crown.	In	
1438,	Philip	the	Good	allowed	the	Flemish	and	Italian	owners	of	a	ship	confiscated	in	
Valencia	to	compensate	their	loss	with	the	seizure	of	Catalan-Aragonese	property	in	
Flanders.	Initially	the	Council	of	Bruges	managed	to	postpone	the	measure,	but	fearing	
its	application,	Alfonso	the	Magnanimous	ordered	Catalan	merchants	to	prepare	for	a	
departure	from	Burgundian	territory	in	1439.	The	collective	boycott	succeeded:	letters	
of	mark	were	replaced	by	a	slight	levy	on	Aragonese	imports,	which	would	be	further	
cut	down	afterwards101.		
			There	are	several	evidences	pointing	to	the	fact	that	overseas	commercial	privileges	
could	have	motivated	merchants	to	keep	their	affiliation	with	the	Catalan-Aragonese	
nation.	Right	after	the	Aragonese	conquest	of	Sicily	and	the	subsequent	granting	of	
privileges,	the	Catalan	merchants	that	had	been	previously	residing	in	the	Provençal	
quarters	and	benefited	from	their	privileges	seemingly	moved	out	to	the	newly	
created	Catalan	quarters102.	In	the	early	fourteenth	century,	when	some	Mallorcan	
merchants	settled	in	Seville	refused	to	pay	an	extraordinary	tax	to	cover	for	the	repair	
of	the	Catalan	alfondech,	Jaume	Llompart,	the	Catalan	consul	appointed	by	Barcelona,	
declared	that	Mallorcan	merchants	had	customarily	brought	their	disputes	before	the	
Catalan	consul,	as	well	as	benefited	from	the	rights	and	freedoms	granted	to	the	
Catalan-Aragonese	subjects	by	the	king	of	Castile103.	In	1299,	another	dispute	in	Sicily	
points	as	well	towards	the	same	direction.	Pere	de	Grau,	shipmaster	from	Mallorca,	
had	been	accused	of	grabbing	a	sea	chest	belonging	to	a	certain	seaman	named	
Antonio.	The	said	Antonio	brought	the	case	before	the	Catalan	consul	of	Palermo,	who	
found	against	Pere.	But	the	very	next	day	Pere	de	Grau	appeared	once	again	before	
the	Catalan	consul	in	the	presence	of	his	notary,	and	stated	baldly	that	he	had	no	
intention	whatsoever	of	obeying	the	consul’s	sentence	in	the	case;	he	insisted	that																																																									
99	(Abulafia,	David,	‘Catalan	Merchants	and	the	Western	Mediterranean,	1236-1300:	Studies	in	
the	Notarial	Acts	of	Barcelona	and	Sicily’,	p.	227;	Epstein,	S.	R.,	An	island	for	itself:	economic	
development	and	social	change	in	late	medieval	Sicily	(Cambridge,	1992),	p.	93;	Hillgarth,	
Ibidem,	p.	46).	With	respect	to	Valencians	engaging	this	route,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	city	
was	a	major	Sicilian	supplier	around	the	same	period:	between	1381	and	1399,	its	cloth	
exports	to	those	parts	amounted	to	6.6	tons	(Epstein,	Ibidem,	p.	229).	
100	Coulon,	Barcelone	et	le	Grand	Commerce	d’Orient,	pp.	196-200;	Carrere,	Barcelone,	centre	
economique,	pp.	609,	641.	It	is	not	necessary	to	point	out	that	Valencians	made	extensive	use	
of	this	route:	see	Ashtor,	Ibidem,	pp.	140,	198,	232.		
101	Gelderblom,	Cities	of	Commerce,	p.	217.	
102	Abulafia,	‘Catalan	Merchants	and	the	Western	Mediterranean’,	pp.	228-229.	103	Cabezelo,	J.	V.,	and	Soler,	J.	L.	‘El	consulado	catalán	de	Sevilla	a	inicios	del	siglo	XVI:	
disputas	políticas	y	realidad	mercantil	en	el	Atlántico’,	pp.	179-181.	
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“this	consul	does	not	have	any	jurisdiction	over	citizens	of	Mallorca	but	only	over	
those	who	are	under	the	dominion	of	the	king	of	Aragon”.	It	seems,	however,	that	
Pere	was	persuaded	to	comply	at	the	end.	Other	fellow	Mallorcans	who	intervened	in	
the	disputed	as	arbiters	further	declared	that	there	were	no	grounds	to	set	aside	the	
decision	of	the	Catalan	consul	in	Palermo,	as	established	arbiter	of	civil	and	
commercial	disputes	among	Catalans	in	Sicily.	Moreover,	the	consul	himself	declared	
that	Catalans,	including	Mallorcans,	came	freely	and	enjoyed	rights	of	tax	exemption	in	
Sicily	thanks	to	his	own	undertakings	and	permit104.	Catalans	privileges,	therefore,	
reinforced	the	authority	of	Catalan	consuls	overseas.	
	
	
Enforcing	cross-national	contracts	
	
	
In	the	chapter	devoted	to	the	merchant’s	business	we	already	saw	that	Valencian	
merchants	did	not	hesitate	to	enter	into	contracts	with	non-Aragonese	subjects,	like	
Castilian	shipmasters	and	Italian	operators.	After	all,	venturing	into	new	markets	
involved	frequently	the	use	of	foreign	agents,	and	the	same	might	happen	the	other	
way	round,	when	foreigners	did	businesses	in	Valencia.	Since	none	of	the	mechanisms	
analysed	so	far	is	applicable	here,	how	did	contract	enforcement	work	in	relation	with	
these	cross-national	transactions?		
			In	litigation	between	people	from	different	trading	nations,	it	was	common	usage	
that	the	claimant	should	apply	to	the	defendant’s	consul105.	When	dealing	with	the	
case	of	Pasqual	Guardiola	we	have	already	seen	that,	in	words	of	the	council	of	
Valencia,	the	offended	party	had	a	right	to	“choose	the	judge	that	better	suits	him”,	
the	word	judge	referring	here	to	the	judicial	institution	that	should	settle	the	
lawsuit106.	The	underlying	rationale	for	cross-national	conflict	resolution	was	
reciprocity:	Valencian	and	Catalan	consulates	would	administer	justice	on	behalf	of	
foreigners,	even	if	it	turned	against	their	fellow	citizens	or	connationals,	in	expectation	
that	the	institutions	of	origin	of	the	foreign	plaintiffs	will	behave	in	the	same	way.	In	
Catalan	realms,	it	seems	that	in	case	of	dispute	between	a	Catalan	and	a	foreigner,	the	
latter	was	allowed	to	choose	one	of	the	two	arbiters;	Pisan	law	specifically	foresaw	
that	each	party	had	a	right	to	appoint	one	arbiter107.	The	Catalan	overseas	consulates	
frequently	addressed	foreigners’	claims.	Antonio,	the	seaman	we	saw	before	bringing	
his	case	against	the	Mallorcan	Pere	de	Grau	before	the	consul	of	Palermo,	was	a	
citizen	of	Genoa.	In	1450,	a	Jew	from	Messina	called	Xamuel	Debita	appealed	before	
the	Catalan	consul	of	Palermo.	The	said	Jew	had	contracted	a	sea	loan	with	two	
Barcelonan	merchants,	who	had	eventually	been	attacked	by	a	corsair	and	could	not	
recover	the	payment.	In	face	of	the	evidence,	the	Catalan	consul	divided																																																									
104	Abulafia,	Ibidem,	pp.	237-238.	
105	Sometimes,	however,	merchants	might	bring	their	cases	before	a	different	court	in	the	
expectation	of	achieving	a	more	favourable	verdict:	we	will	review	some	of	these	cases	
regarding	when	dealing	with	the	Valencian	merchants	in	Granada.	See	also	Ogilvie,	S.	
Institutions	and	European	Trade:	Merchant	Guilds,	1000-1800,	p.	261;	Ashtor,	op.	cit.,	p.	415.	
106	AMV,	LM	g3-12,	48v-49r.	
107	Soldani,	‘Madurs	consellers	o	males	suggestions?’,	129.	
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responsibilities	between	the	moneylender	and	the	merchants108.	Even	in	Bruges,	
where	urban	institutions	played	an	active	role	in	cross-national	conflict	resolution,	
there	is	record	of	Flemish	merchants	bringing	their	claims	before	the	Catalan	
consulate109.		
			Reciprocity	had,	nevertheless,	serious	limits.	Depending	on	the	state	of	diplomatic	
relations	and	the	balance	of	forces	between	two	nations	in	a	certain	region,	foreign	
consulates	might	display	far	less	collaborative	than	they	would	otherwise.	In	1455,	a	
Genoese	merchant	residing	in	Almeria	refused	to	pay	back	his	debts	to	Ferrando	
Eiximenez,	a	merchant	from	Valencia.	The	latter,	instead	of	turning	to	the	Genoese	
consul	of	Malaga,	whose	nation	was	openly	hostile	against	the	Aragonese	around	this	
time,	sued	the	Genoese	before	the	Granada	officials110.	
	
	
Valencia	within	the	consular	network	of	Barcelona	
	
	
Valencian	merchants	were	no	doubt	integrated	within	the	Catalan	consular	network,	
which	is	the	same	to	say	that	they	submitted	to	the	overseas	consuls	appointed	from	
Barcelona.	But,	what	happened	on	an	institutional	level?	What	about	the	city	council	
of	Valencia?	In	face	of	the	considerable	resistance	that	the	kingdom	of	Mallorca	
offered	against	the	Barcelonan	monopoly,	this	is	not	an	unjustified	question	at	all111.	
			The	reincorporation	of	Mallorca	to	the	Crown	of	Aragon	opened	up	a	bitter	dispute	
between	the	said	kingdom	and	the	city	of	Barcelona	with	respect	to	the	privilege	of	
appointing	overseas	consuls,	since	the	former	had	set	up	a	parallel	consular	network	
during	its	period	of	independence	(1276-1343).	Seemingly,	this	dispute	came	to	an	end	
during	the	reign	of	Peter	IV,	who	ruled	in	favour	of	Barcelona	and	ratified	her	exclusive	
privilege	of	1268112.	Therefore,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	Valencia	lacked	any	legal	basis	to	
even	consider	setting	up	her	own	consulates,	at	least	if	we	stick	to	the	letter	of	the	
law.	Moreover,	the	aforementioned	correspondence	with	the	consulates	of	Marseille,	
Alghero	and	Cagliari	suggests	that	it	was	properly	integrated	within	the	Barcelonan	
network.																																																									
108	Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	économique.,	p.	119.	109	Capmany,	Antonio.	Memorias	históricas	sobre	la	marina,	comercio	y	artes	de	la	antigua	
ciudad	de	Barcelona,	p.	132.	110	Salicrú	i	Lluch,	R.	‘The	Catalano-Aragonese	commercial	presence	in	the	sultanate	of	
Granada	during	the	reign	of	Alfonso	the	Magnanimous’,	Journal	of	Medieval	History,	27,	3	
(2001),	p.	305;	Petti	Balbi,	G.	Negoziare	fuori	patria:	nazioni	e	genovesi	in	età	medieval	
(Bolonia,	2005),	p.	167.	
111	(Duran	i	Duelt,	‘Monarquia,	consellers	i	mercaders’;	Cabezelo	and	Soler,	‘El	consulado	
catalán	de	Sevilla	a	inicios	del	siglo	XIV’;	Sánchez,	Manuel,	‘Mallorquines	y	genoveses	en	
Almería	durante	el	primer	tercio	del	siglo	XIV:	el	proceso	contra	Jaume	Manfré,	1334’,	
Miscel.lània	de	Textos	Medievals,	6	(1988),	pp.	103-162.	Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	
économique,	p.	116.			
112	See	Duran,	‘La	fi	del	sistema	consular	mallorquí	i	les	seves	repercussions	en	el	català:	el	cas	
dels	consolats	de	Pera	i	Constantinoble’;	Ferrer	i	Mallol,	‘El	consolat	de	mar	i	els	consolats	
d’ultramar’,	pp.	69-70.	
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			It	is	remarkable	that	no	citizen	of	Valencia	appears	in	the	lengthy	list	of	consuls	
appointed	by	Barcelona	for	the	period	1380-1462	provided	by	Claude	Carrère,	
particularly	given	the	presence	of	citizens	from	smaller	towns	as	Girona,	Perpignan,	
Cardona	and	Tortosa	—all	of	them	within	the	Principality	of	Catalonia—113.	All	we	have	
is	the	mention	of	Felip	de	Denia,	a	likely	Valencian	who	was	appointed	consol	de	
catalans	for	Tunis	by	James	I	in	the	far	away	1258114.	What	the	city	council	of	Valencia	
could	do	and	actually	did	was	to	suggest	consular	candidates	to	be	appointed	by	
Barcelona.	On	July	1416,	after	Barcelona	had	removed	Pere	Jenoves	from	the	office	in	
Genoa,	the	aldermen	of	Valencia	wrote	to	the	Council	of	Barcelona	suggesting	her	own	
candidate:	Thomas	Italia,	an	Italian	merchant	well	known	among	Valencia’s	mercantile	
circles.	This	episode	seemingly	opened	up	a	dispute	between	the	two	cities115.		
			On	the	other	hand,	the	city	of	Valencia	closely	looked	after	its	fellow	citizens	
overseas.	As	we	will	see	in	the	following	chapter,	it	kept	regular	correspondence	with	
the	most	frequented	foreign	cities	in	order	to	safeguard	their	property	rights,	release	
captives	and	retrieve	the	state	of	deceased	merchants,	even	though	most	of	these	
tasks	might	have	been	fulfilled	by	overseas	consuls.		
			It	is	noteworthy	that	each	state	within	the	Crown	of	Aragon	was	responsible	for	its	
own	citizens,	who	might	be	subject	to	different	tax	burdens	overseas.	In	1396,	a	big	
galley	from	Valencia	was	retained	in	Beirut	by	the	Catalan	consul	of	Damascus	on	the	
pretext	that	it	had	to	pay	some	additional	dues.	Those	dues,	it	was	said,	were	to	pay	
for	the	release	of	several	merchants	from	Barcelona	who	had	been	imprisoned	by	the	
Mamluk	sultan.	While	the	city	of	Barcelona	considered	that	all	Catalan	merchants	had	
to	contribute	to	this,	the	council	of	Valencia	boldly	reacted	against	the	tax,	claiming	
that	each	kingdom	and	principality	had	to	pay	for	its	own	expenses.	The	same	way	that	
Valencians	paid	for	their	own	post	service	in	Granada,	Barcelonans	should	pay	for	their	
own	services	in	the	Levant.	Several	letters	were	exchanged	between	the	two	cities,	
and	the	conflict	was	seemingly	still	going	on	around	1400116.	
	
	
II.2.	Valencia	and	its	sphere	of	influence	
	
	
There	was	certainly	an	area	that	can	be	regarded	as	the	Valencian	sphere	of	influence	
in	the	early	fifteenth	century:	it	is	the	route	that	connected	the	Spanish	Levant	with	
the	coastal	strips	of	Granada	and	Barbaria.	This	area,	which	Braudel	appropriately	
called	the	Mediterranean	channel,	made	a	coherent	unit	both	from	the	perspective	of	
																																																								
113	Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	économique.,	pp.	130-136.	
114	Igual,	David,	‘L’economia	comercial	i	maritime	de	València	durant	el	regnat	de	Jaume	I’,	
Jaume	I:	Commemoració	del	VIII	centenary	del	naixement	de	Jaume	I	(Barcelona,	2013),	p.	736.	
Special	thanks	to	David	Igual	for	bringing	this	information	to	my	attention.	
115	AMV,	LM,	g3-13,	130r;	Igual,	David.	‘Los	grupos	mercantiles	y	la	expansión	política	de	la	
Corona	de	Aragón’,	p.	24.	
116	(AMV,	LM	7,	f.	42r.,	transcribed	in	Rubio,	Epistolari	de	la	València	medieval,	pp.	148-151).	
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commerce	and	diplomatic	relations117.	Around	the	second	half	of	the	fourteenth	
century,	at	the	same	time	that	Barcelona	withdrew	from	these	markets	to	specialize	in	
the	Levant	trade,	“official”	Catalan	consulates	seemingly	vanished	from	the	area.	The	
consulate	of	Tunis	had	to	be	re-opened	in	1406,	and	it	will	remain	the	only	one	under	
Barcelonan	control	along	the	first	half	of	the	fifteenth	century.	Valencia	—along	with	
Mallorca	in	the	North	African	case—	took	the	lead	in	the	region	after	Barcelona,	yet	
several	mysteries	remain	about	it.	Valencian	merchants	did	seemingly	not	enjoy	a	
privileged	status	in	these	parts,	the	involvement	of	the	Monarchy	was	weak	and	no	
consulates	are	mentioned	in	the	few	treaties	preserved	to	the	present	day118.	Who	
was	behind	the	remaining	consular	network?	What	were	the	implications	for	contract	
enforcement?		How	were	disputes	settled	in	those	parts?	
	
	
Valencians	and	Mallorcans	in	Barbaria	
	
	
By	the	period	of	our	study,	the	Maghreb	was	a	turbulent	region	characterized	by	
frequent	upheavals	and	coups	d’état,	ruled	by	three	large	sultanates	running	from	the	
Atlantic	to	the	strait	of	Sicily.	West	to	East,	in	the	first	place	came	Fez,	roughly	
corresponding	to	modern	day	Morocco;	then	Tlemcen,	in	the	central	Maghreb;	in	the	
Eastern	tip,	Tunis.	The	fact	that	their	main	emporia	functioned	as	outlet	markets	for	
the	trans-Saharan	gold	route	made	them	an	attractive	target	for	Valencian	merchants,	
who	freighted	several	ships	a	year	bound	for	North	Africa	and	made	up	a	sizeable	
foreign	community	in	those	parts119.			
			The	institutional	background	for	this	commerce	is,	however,	far	from	well	known.	In	
the	thirteenth	century,	the	kings	of	Aragon	held	two	Royal	consulates	in	the	port	cities	
of	Bougie	and	Tunis120,	and	maritime	hegemony	enabled	them	to	exert	a	proto-
colonial	dominion	over	the	North-African	sultans,	who	granted	generous	privileges	to	
the	Catalan	merchants	and	were	further	compelled	to	pay	tribute	to	their	king.	
However,	this	dominion	seemingly	faded	away	throughout	the	fourteenth	century,	up	
until	the	point	that	the	Aragonese	kings	found	increasingly	difficult	to	collect	and	even																																																									117	López,	María	Dolores,	La	corona	de	Aragón	y	el	Magreb	en	el	siglo	XIV,	1331-1410	
(Barcelona,	1995),	p.	183;	Braudel,	F.,	The	Mediterranean	and	the	Mediterranean	World	in	the	
Age	of	Philip	II,	Volume	I	(Berkeley,	1995),	p.	117.	
118	It	should	be	noted	that	these	developments	stand	in	sharp	contrast	with	Olivia	Constable’s	
assumptions.	Her	famous	work	took	for	granted	that	the	pre-Black	Death	situation	in	the	
Maghreb	remained	constant	throughout	the	late	fourteenth	and	the	fifteenth	century,	
whereas	the	truth	is	that	Aragonese	political	influence	faded	away	and	new	types	of	consular	
institutions	arose.	See	Constable,	Housing	the	Stranger,	pp.	296-305.	
119	An	excellent	piece	of	work	on	these	matters	can	be	found	in	López,	La	corona	de	Aragón	y	
el	Magreb	en	el	siglo	XIV,	1331-1410.	See	also	López,	María	Dolores,	‘La	circulación	de	las	élites	
económicas	en	el	Mediterráneo	occidental	medieval:	el	Magreb	como	polo	de	atracción	de	los	
mercaderes	catalanoaragoneses’,	Acta	historica	et	archaeological	mediaevalia,	22	(2001),	pp.	
721-734;	Igual,	David,	‘Navegación	y	comercio	entre	Valencia	y	el	Norte	de	África	durante	el	
siglo	XV’.	
120	Ferrer	i	Mallol,	Ibidem,	p.	66.		
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to	have	recognized	those	tributes121.	Diplomatic	relations	towards	these	parts	
seemingly	dropped.	In	1406,	after	a	Mallorcan	corsair	attacked	Fez,	the	Moroccan	
diplomats	appeared	before	the	king	of	Aragon	claiming	that	such	an	action	was	a	
transgression	against	the	prevailing	truce	between	them.	However,	none	could	
present	any	evidence	of	such	a	treaty:	diplomatic	relations	had	ceased	long	time	
ago122.	In	the	early	fifteenth	century,	the	political	background	for	Valencian	commerce	
was	rather	obscure:	the	subjects	of	Aragon	seemingly	enjoyed	no	privileged	status,	
and	their	consulates	were	no	formally	defined	by	any	means	in	the	kingdoms	of	Fez	
and	Tlemcen.	It	is	true	that	we	ignore	the	content	of	the	1412	treatise	between	
Aragon,	Granada	and	Fez,	which	might	cast	some	light	over	this	matter,	yet	later	
Valencian	correspondence,	which	do	refers	to	the	“bona	pau	e	amistat	insoluble”	
between	these	crowns,	never	ever	mentions	any	commercial	clause123.	
			It	was	certainly	the	absence	of	fluid	relations	between	the	Crown	and	the	North	
African	sultanates	what	impelled	the	Council	of	Valencia	(following	previous	and	
contemporary	Mallorcan	developments)	to	step	out	in	these	parts	on	behalf	of	its	
merchants,	seeking	for	restitution	in	case	of	robbery,	negotiating	the	release	of	
captives,	retrieving	the	estate	of	deceased	businessmen	and	monitoring	the	
undertakings	of	the	overseas	Christian	consulates124.	In	November	1401,	the	aldermen	
of	Valencia	report	in	the	port	of	Algiers	the	capture	of	a	ship	loaded	with	cloth	and	
other	cargoes,	as	well	as	the	imprisonment	of	its	crew,	by	an	armed	vessel	bearing	the	
flag	of	the	king	of	Fez.	The	aldermen	requested	the	said	king	to	release	the	captives	in	
honour	of	his	“customary	fairness	and	piety”125.	Customhouse	officials	were	another	
ever-present	peril	for	Valencians.	In	April	1414,	Johan	de	Xarch	carried	some	cloth	to	
be	sold	in	the	city	of	Fez,	yet	the	alcayt	Salem	Moxerifa	seized	part	of	his	cargo	on	the	
pretext	that	it	would	please	the	sultan.	Johan	refused	to	give	them	away,	stating	that	
those	cloths	were	for	sale,	yet	if	the	sultan	wanted	to	pay	he	would	gladly	sell	them	to	
him.	At	the	end,	however,	the	said	Johan	was	confiscated	his	goods:	the	custom	official	
promised	to	pay	them	later	on,	but	unsurprisingly	failed	to	do	so.	At	request	of	its	
outraged	citizen,	the	council	of	Valencia	interceded	before	the	king	of	Fez	to	request																																																									
121	López,	Ibidem,	p.	171.			122	Salicrú	i	Lluch,	R.	‘L’ambaixada	a	Fes	d’Antoni	Queixal	i	Ramon	Conesa,	1413-1414’,	Acta	
histórica	et	archaeologica	mediaevalia,	19	(1998),	p.	230,	footnote	4.	
123	Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	économique.,	p.	117;	Duran,	‘La	fi	del	sistema	consular	
mallorquí’,	p.	162;	AMV,	LM,	g3-12,	135r-135v;	Salicru,	‘L’ambaixada	a	Fes’,	p.	230.		
124	This	probably	explains	why	the	correspondence	between	the	council	of	Valencia	and	the	
North	African	sultanates	is	overrepresented	in	our	sources.	Out	of	the	dozens	of	Valencian	
merchants	identified	by	Enrique	Cruselles	in	the	notarial	acts	of	Vicent	Saera,	roughly	
corresponding	to	the	first	half	of	the	fifteenth	century,	only	three	are	engaged	in	commerce	
with	the	central	and	western	Maghreb,	compared	to	the	three	that	are	found	trading	in	
Bruges,	the	four	in	Tunis	and	the	seven	in	Sicily	(Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	
siglo	XV,	p.	167).	Yet	the	correspondence	with	the	sultanates	of	Fez	and	Tlemcen	clearly	
outnumbers	that	with	the	rulers	of	the	aforementioned	regions.	This	probably	signals	two	
circumstances.	On	the	one	hand,	Valencian	merchants	in	Barbaria	were	more	likely	to	be	
abused,	and	hence	needed	a	more	vigorous	support	on	the	part	of	their	city	council.	On	the	
other,	Valencian	merchants	elsewhere	probably	turned	to	the	Catalan	consuls	to	address	the	
same	problems,	hence	leaving	no	track	in	the	municipal	archives.		
125	AMV,	LM,	g3-7,	217v-218r.	
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the	payment	to	be	met126.	Retrieval	of	the	property	of	deceased	fellow	citizens,	a	task	
usually	carried	out	by	consuls	elsewhere,	was	at	times	taken	over	by	the	Valencian	
council	in	case	of	conflict	with	the	local	authorities.	In	May	1414	the	aldermen	report	
the	seizure	of	the	estate	of	two	deceased	merchants.	The	previous	month	of	
September,	Arnau	Soguer,	merchant	from	Mallorca,	and	Johan	Gabella,	from	Genoa,	
fell	fatally	ill	while	staying	in	Alacait	as	factors	of	Nicholau	de	Montell,	a	Valencian	
citizen.	The	Muslim	officials	seized	“against	all	justice”	the	goods	of	the	deceased,	and	
thus	the	aldermen	wrote	the	king	of	Fez	asking	for	retrieval	on	behalf	of	the	said	
Nicholau127.		
			The	pivotal	organisation	for	contract	enforcement	in	these	parts	was	what	our	
sources	commonly	call	the	“Christian	consulate”,	an	uncanny	institution	for	overseas	
merchants	that	seems	unique	of	the	Maghribi	area	during	the	late	fourteenth	and	first	
half	of	the	fifteenth	century.	Unlike	the	merchant	consulates	usually	described	in	the	
literature128,	these	seemingly	did	not	derive	their	authority	from	explicit	delegation	by	
their	home	governments,	for	they	were	meant	to	be	trans-national.	We	know	little	in	
relation	to	their	roots,	yet	chronological	reasons	suggest	that	they	might	be	somehow	
related	to	the	gradual	transformation	of	the	Mallorcan	consulates	in	North	Africa	after	
the	re-incorporation	of	the	Balearic	kingdom	in	1343129.	They	surely	benefited	from	
the	institutional	know-how	developed	by	this	previous	Mallorcan	network,	yet	they	
were	of	a	different	kind.		Early	fourteenth	century	Mallorcan	consuls	were	appointed	
by	the	king	at	request	of	the	city	council,	whereas	our	Christian	consulates	are	clearly	
self-managed	by	the	merchants	themselves.	The	term	“consol	per	los	mercaders”	
(consul	by	the	merchants)	even	appears	in	several	Mallorcan	documents	from	1386,	
1387	and	1389130.	In	the	correspondence	of	the	Valencian	aldermen	with	Aymerich	
Berart,	consul	in	Tlemcen	in	1412,	the	latter	is	regarded	indistinctively	as	“Christian	
consul”,	“merchant	consul”	and	“consul	of	the	Christian	merchants”,	further	
suggesting	that	consular	election	rested	upon	the	merchant	community	residing	or	
operating	in	those	parts131.	Incidentally,	this	circumstance	was	by	no	means	
exceptional	within	the	Catalan	world:	consuls	in	Bruges	were	usually	appointed	by	
similar	proceedings,	which	were	recognized	and	regulated	by	Catalan	customs	and	
laws132.	With	respect	to	the	Maghreb,	it	is	less	clear	what	was	the	national	and	
regional	identity	of	the	merchants	that	could	take	part	in	these	consular	elections	and	
over	what	nations	these	consuls	exerted	jurisdiction.	One	might	think	that	“Christian																																																									
126	AMV,	LM	g3-12,	131v-132r.	
127	(AMV,	LM	g3-12,	135r-135v).	These	problems	were	also	endemic	in	the	Muslim	Levant:	see	
Ashtor,	Ibidem,	p.	400.	
128	See,	for	instance,	Gelderblom,	Cities	of	Commerce,	p.	104.	
129	Daniel	Duran	has	suggested	that	Mallorca	still	exercised	some	influence	in	the	Maghribi	
consular	affairs	during	the	fifteenth	century:	see	Duran	i	Duelt,	D.	‘Consolats	de	mar	i	consolats	
d’ultramar:	la	defensa	de	l’espai	marítim	en	temps	de	Martí	l’Humà’,	p.	568.	See	also	Coulon,	
Barcelone	et	le	grand	commerce,	p.	65.		130	Ibidem;	ARM,	AH	53,	f.	102r-v,	4th	August	1386;	27th	July	1389,	Honein,	ARM,	AH	Clero	
2595,	f.	119r.	(unpublished,	Daniel	Duran).	
131	AMV,	g3-11,	37r-v.	11th	June	1412;	AMV,	LM,	g3-11,	169v-170r.	25th	January	1413;	AMV,	LM	
11,	f.	36	v-37	r.	6th	June	1412.	Transcribed	in	Rubio	Vela,	Epistolari,	p.	173.	
132	Ferrer	i	Mallol,	M.	T.,	‘El	consolat	de	mar	i	els	consolats	d’ultramar’,	p.	69;	Desportes,	P.	‘El	
consulado	catalán	de	Brujas,	1330-1488’,	in	Aragón	en	la	Edad	Media	(Zaragoza,	1999),	p.	385.	
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consulate”	was	just	another	name	for	“Catalan	consulate”,	since	Valencians	and	
Mallorcans	probably	accounted	for	most	of	the	Christian	community	settled	in	
Barbaria.	However,	the	fact	that	many	Italian,	Provençal	and	Castilian	merchants	
traded	in	those	parts	through	Valencian	and	Mallorcan	networks	might	suggest	the	
possibility	that	these	Christian	consulates	served	the	broad	Frankish	community	as	
well.	Marseille	had	held	in	the	past	her	own	consulates	in	Ceuta,	Bougie	and	Tunis,	yet	
it	is	not	clear	what	the	situation	was	in	this	period133.	Genoa,	on	the	other	hand,	held	
by	this	time	only	two	consulates	in	the	Maghreb:	a	main	one	in	Tunis	and	a	smaller	one	
in	Bougie134.	With	respect	to	Castile,	there	is	no	trace	of	consulates	in	this	region.	It	is	
even	possible	that	the	Christian	consulates	had	been	the	outcome	of	joint	diplomatic	
undertakings	of	the	Iberian	Christian	kingdoms	with	the	Maghribi	states,	since	there	is	
precedent	in	that	respect	regarding	non	commercial	issues.	For	the	moment,	however,	
the	question	remains	open.	In	any	case,	there	is	evidence	of	foreigners	turning	to	the	
Christian	consulates.	In	1375,	for	instance,	Giovanni	del	Giudice,	citizen	of	Genoa,	is	
seen	acting	as	a	witness	along	several	Mallorcan	merchants	before	Jaume	Desmàs,	
“ara	consol	per	los	mercaders	en	la	duana	de	Ffes”135.	In	1387,	Velasco	Ferrandis,	
Castillian	merchant	settled	in	Algiers,	draws	up	a	document	before	Francesch	Paschal,	
Christian	consul	in	the	said	place,	giving	his	daughter	powers	of	attorney	to	recover	
certain	debts	owed	to	him	by	Bernat	Oliver,	Mallorcan	merchant136.	It	remains	to	be	
seen	whether	these	foreign	non-Catalan	merchants	could	be	judged	and	imprisoned	by	
the	Christian	consuls	on	the	same	grounds	as	Valencians	and	Mallorcans,	or	conversely	
made	only	an	opportunistic	use	of	such	facilities.	In	case	the	former	was	true,	
enforcing	contracts	with	foreign	Christian	partners	would	have	posed	no	more	
problems	than	enforcing	them	with	fellow	citizens	and	Catalans,	and	would	put	into	
new	perspective	the	extensive	use	that	Valencian	merchants	made	of	Castilian	and	
Italian	carriers	in	Barbaria.	
			Although	the	label	suggests	these	consulates	served	the	broad	multi-national	
Christian	community	settled	or	visiting	the	North	African	cities,	we	only	have	
documentary	evidence	of	them	settling	actual	conflicts	among	Valencians	and	
Mallorcans.	The	Valencian	municipal	correspondence	on	the	dispute	between	Francesc	
de	Montfort	and	Nicolau	Montagut	clearly	makes	out	that	it	was	expected	that	
contractual	breaches	should	be	addressed	before	the	consul,	who	would	render	justice	
according	to	capitol	e	costum	de	mar	and	impose	the	corresponding	punishment137.	
The	absence	of	public	notaries	in	Barbaria	gave	the	consuls	a	prominent	role	as	
privileged	witnesses138,	since	their	presence	ex	ante	in	the	drawing	up	of	contracts	
																																																								133	Dufourcq,	Charles,	La	vie	quotidienne	dans	les	ports	mediterraneens	au	Moyen	Age.	
Provence,	Languedoc,	Catalogne	(Paris,	1975),	p.	121.	134	Petti	Balbi,	G.	Negoziare	fuori	patria,	p.	200.	135	1st	February	1375,	ARM,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	34r-35v.	(unpublished,	Daniel	Duran).	136	1387,	ARM,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	74r-v.	(unpublished,	Daniel	Duran).	
137	AMV,	g3-11,	37r-v.	11th	June	1412;	AMV,	LM,	g3-11,	169v-170r.	25th	January	1413;	AMV,	LM	
11,	f.	36	v-37	r.	6th	June	1412.	Transcribed	in	Rubio	Vela,	Epistolari,	p.	173.	
138	Similarly,	chaplains	could	be	used	as	notaries	for	the	Christian	merchant	community.	For	
instance,	Jaume	Olzina,	vicar	general	for	the	bishopic	of	Morocco,	is	seen	drawing	up	a	will	
document	in	Fez	on	behalf	of	a	Mallorcan	merchant	in	1387	(ARM,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	58r-59v.).	
This	ressembles	the	role	fulfilled	by	the	Venetian	chaplains	in	the	Levant,	who	served	as	
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could	help	settling	disputes	ex	post,	whether	in	Africa	or	mainland	Aragon.	In	July	
1389,	Ayhim	Xulel	and	Issach	Tauhil,	both	Jewish	merchants	from	Mallorca,	draw	up	a	
commenda	contract	before	the	merchant	consul	of	Honein,	Pere	Vinyals.	The	first,	
taking	from	the	second	several	bales	of	cloth	to	be	sold	in	Tlemcen	and	Veni,	commits	
to	come	back	to	Honein	and	divide	the	proceeds	with	his	partner:	otherwise	—the	
document	states	explicitly—,	he	could	be	sent	to	prison139.	Furthermore,	the	evidence	
presents	Christian	overseas	consulates	collaborating	along	with	Aragonese	institutions	
and	mainland	Consulates	of	the	Sea	in	the	gathering	of	information,	detection	of	
cheaters	and	enforcing	of	contracts,	at	least	to	a	certain	degree.	In	January	1391,	
Antonio	Aspeleti,	Venetian,	and	Gaudio	de	Lipari,	from	the	Principality,	borrow	52	
dobles	from	a	Mallorcan	merchant	before	the	consul	of	Bona.	The	contract	foresees	
the	credit	to	be	paid	back	in	Mallorca,	and	in	case	they	fail	to	fulfil	their	obligations,	
Gaudio	would	remain	in	the	Balearic	prison	as	a	pledge	until	the	payment	be	made140.	
In	1432,	Pere	Damiga,	tax	official	from	Valencia,	writes	to	Pasqual	Dezcamps,	“naval	
consul”	in	Oral,	to	make	sure	the	goods	that	Jaume	Rosell	had	been	sending	to	
Abrasim	Benuno,	Jew	from	Oran,	are	really	addressed	to	him	and	not	a	third	agent141.	
In	1412,	a	dispute	over	some	pieces	of	gold	further	illustrates	this	collaboration.	That	
year,	the	Mallorcan	shipmaster	Perpinian	Forsor	had	departed	from	Honein	carrying	
some	merchandise	and	gold	bound	to	Mallorca.	On	his	way,	he	was	attacked	by	a	
Moorish	ship	near	Ibiza,	yet	two	merchants	on	board,	Christofol	Brelams	and	Martí	de	
Venecia,	managed	to	escape.	When	Christofol	arrived	to	Mallorca,	he	declared	that	
the	shipmaster	had	concealed	the	800	gold	dinars	in	a	pine	drawer.	Some	time	latter,	
the	ship	appeared	in	Ibiza,	yet	carrying	no	pieces	of	gold.	The	said	Christofol,	brought	
before	a	tribunal	in	Mallorca,	accused	then	the	Muslims	and	addressed	to	the	Christian	
consul	in	Algiers	to	confirm	the	exactitude	of	his	declaration142.	
			A	dispute	in	the	city	of	Tlemcen,	capital	of	the	eponymous	kingdom,	might	allow	us	
to	shed	some	light	on	the	peculiar	relation	between	the	Council	of	Valencia,	its	
Consulate	of	the	Sea	and	these	overseas	Maghribi	consulates.	On	the	18th	January	
1412,	Aymerich	Berart,	“consol	dels	mercaders	en	la	ciutat	de	Tremicé”,	submitted	a	
letter	to	the	Valencian	consuls	reporting	a	dispute	between	two	merchants	of	Valencia	
and	the	subsequent	measures	he	had	taken	to	address	it.	Seemingly,	Nicolau	de	
Montagut,	merchant	of	the	said	city,	had	been	condemned	by	the	consul	to	pay	a	
certain	quantity	of	“dobles”	to	Francesch	de	Montfort,	also	Valencian,	presumably	on	
the	grounds	of	breach	of	contractual	obligations.	In	face	of	the	former’s	resistance	to	
comply	with	the	judgement,	the	consul	reports	that	he	was	left	with	no	option	but	
sending	him	to	prison.	This	led	to	a	bitter	dispute	reflected	in	the	correspondence	of	
the	aldermen	of	Valencia	with	the	several	parties	involved.	On	the	6th	of	June	of	the	
same	year,	the	Valencian	council	submitted	a	pair	of	letters:	one	addressed	to	the	
consul,	Aymerich	Berart,	and	another	to	Francesch	de	Montfort,	the	plaintiff,	
																																																																																																																																																																		
notaries	for	the	European	merchants	who	resided	or	sojourned	in	those	emporia:	see	Ahstor,	
Levant	Trade	in	the	Later	Middle	Ages,	pp.	XIV-XV.	
139	27th	July	1389,	Honein,	ARM,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	119r.	(unpublished,	Daniel	Duran).	140	30th	January	1391,	Bona,	ARM,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	173r-v	(unpublished,	Daniel	Duran).	
141	Guiral,	Valencia,	puerto	mediterráneo,	p.	85.	
142	Macaire,	Pierre,	Majorque	et	le	commerce	internationale,	p.	194.	
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requesting	them	to	release	Nicolau	and	dispatch	him	to	the	city	of	Valencia143.	On	the	
first	place,	the	aldermen	argued,	shipping	the	said	Nicolau	back	to	Valencia	would	
allow	him	to	take	advantage	of	his	family,	friends	and	goods	to	settle	all	his	debts.	The	
Valencian	aldermen,	on	the	other	hand,	complained	about	the	way	Nicolau	has	been	
treated	by	the	consul:	the	former	has	not	been	allowed	to	defend	himself	in	a	fair	trial,	
as	the	merchant	custom	prescribed,	but	was	rather	imprisoned	in	the	Moorish	jail	as	
soon	as	charges	against	him	were	presented	by	Francesch.	For	these	reasons,	the	
aldermen	continued,	Nicolau	had	every	right	to	return	home	and	be	put	under	the	
jurisdiction	of	the	Valencian	Consulate	of	the	Sea,	which	would	render	proper	justice	
according	to	Christian	usage.	Apparently,	the	request	had	no	effect,	for	the	aldermen	
submitted	a	third	letter	on	the	25th	January	1413,	this	time	addressed	to	the	king	of	
Tlemcen	himself,	providing	some	further	details	on	the	case144.	Francesch	Montfort	is	
described	as	a	factor	(he	was	most	probably	a	partner)	settled	in	Tlemcen	on	behalf	of	
Guillem	Vsall,	merchant	of	Valencia.	The	said	Francesch	is	said	to	be	“very	favoured”	in	
the	African	kingdom,	suggesting	that	he	was	a	long-term	settler	well	connected	with	
the	local	rulers	and	officials.	Indeed,	through	other	sources	we	know	that	Francesch	de	
Montfort	had	been	consul	around	1407145.	It	is	probably	this	circumstance,	the	
connivance	of	the	Muslim	authorities,	what	allowed	him	to	send	Nicholau	to	the	
Moorish	prison,	a	recourse	that	was	against	the	Christian	usage	and	arose	much	
complain	among	Nicholau’s	friends	and	relatives.	Considering	that	none	of	their	
requests	have	been	met	so	far,	the	aldermen	appealed	this	time	to	the	sultan	to	
request	him	the	release	of	Nicholau,	even	against	the	consul’s	will.		
			Hereafter	we	lose	trail	of	the	dispute	and	can	only	hypothesize	about	the	outcome,	
yet	these	letters	already	raise	a	whole	set	of	questions	that	need	to	be	tackled.	In	the	
first	place,	regarding	the	identity	of	the	consul	himself.	Aymerich	Berart	is	most	
probably	the	same	person	as	Aimeric	Breart,	a	Valencian	merchant	identified	by	
Enrique	Cruselles	in	the	notarial	acts	of	Vicent	Saera;	he	appears	trading	in	Tlemcen	by	
the	same	year	of	1412146.	Thus,	we	can	assert	that	this	was	a	Valencian	dispute	
addressed	by	a	consul	of	Valencian	origin.	According	to	the	letter	addressed	to	the	
sultan,	his	jurisdiction	encompassed	not	only	the	city	but	the	whole	kingdom	of	
Tlemcen,	which	included	some	of	the	most	frequented	ports	in	the	Valencian	routes,	
as	Honein,	Oran	and	Mostaganem147	(we	will	come	back	to	this	matter	below,	for	the	
number	and	scope	of	the	North	African	consulates	is	a	problematic	issue).	It	is	clear	
that	the	said	Aymerich	had	not	been	appointed	consul	by	Barcelona,	for	it	would	have	
left	written	record	in	the	Barcelonan	archives.	Yet	it	is	sure	that	Valencia	had	not	
appointed	him	either,	since	the	correspondence	makes	clear	that	the	aldermen	did	not	
know	about	him	before	the	dispute	arose.	In	the	first	letter,	these	aldermen	even	
speak	to	him	in	the	following	terms:	“you,	who	are	there	on	behalf	of	the	Christians	as																																																									
143		The	letter	addressed	to	the	consul	is	AMV,	LM	11,	f.	36	v-37	r.	and	can	be	found	
transcribed	in	Rubio,	Epistolari	de	la	València	medieval,	p.	173.	The	second	letter,	addressed	to	
Francesch	de	Montfort,	can	be	found	at	AMV,	g3-11,	37r-v.	11th	June	1412.	
144	AMV,	LM,	g3-11,	169v-170r.	25th	January	1413.	
145	Duran	i	Duelt,	D.	‘Consolats	de	mar	i	consolats	d’ultramar:	la	defensa	de	l’espai	marítim	en	
temps	de	Martí	l’Humà’,	p.	568,	footnote	7.	
146	Also	Francesch	Montfort	is	identified	in	1412,	this	time	in	Oran	(Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	
valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	p.	167).	147	López,	María	Dolores,	La	corona	de	Aragón	y	el	Magreb	en	el	siglo	XIV,	p.	182.	
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a	consul,	as	you	said	and	appears	in	your	letter”	148.	There	is	in	fact	little	doubt	as	for	
the	mercantile	origins	of	this	consular	election:	as	we	said	above,	Aymerich	is	regarded	
in	the	letters	indistinctively	as	“Christian	consul”,	“merchant	consul”	and	“consul	of	the	
Christian	merchants”,	in	certainly	similar	terms	as	other	Maghribi	consuls	we	have	
already	reviewed.	This	mercantile	election,	along	with	the	fact	that	Francesch	de	
Montfort,	his	accomplice	in	the	dispute,	had	been	consul	only	five	years	before,	
reveals	a	lot	about	the	endogamous	character	of	these	Christian	communities.	
			The	city	council	approach	to	the	dispute	between	Nicholau	and	Francesch;	namely,	
the	persistent	request	to	repatriate	the	former	so	as	he	can	be	judged	by	the	local	
Consulate	of	the	Sea,	suggests	that	this	might	have	been	the	customary	modus	
operandi	in	case	of	commercial	conflicts	between	fellow	citizens	in	North	Africa.	Such	
an	approach	offered	the	additional	advantage	that,	as	the	aldermen	argued,	debtors	
had	it	easier	to	pay	back	their	debts	at	home,	where	they	could	count	on	their	own	
goods,	friends	and	relatives	to	raise	the	necessary	funds.	Contracts	drawn	up	in	
Barbaria	before	the	Christian	consuls	sometimes	foresaw	the	payments	to	be	cleared	
in	Mallorca,	what	points	to	the	same	direction	for	the	Balearic	merchants	and	their	
partners.	This	is	the	case	of	the	aforementioned	credit	contract	drawn	up	before	the	
consul	of	Bona	(Tunis)	between	the	Venetian	merchant	Antonio	Aspeleti,	Gaudio	de	
Lipari,	from	Barcelona,	and	Joan	Bru,	Mallorcan	businessman.	In	case	the	creditors	
would	fail	to	fulfil	their	obligations,	the	said	Gaudio	would	remain	in	the	Balearic	
prison	as	a	pledge149.	
			So	far	we	have	dealt	with	Christian	conflicts	brought	before	their	own	consulates.	
However,	Valencian	and	Mallorcan	merchants	did	not	rule	out	the	possibility	to	appeal	
before	Muslim	courts	to	settle	conflicts	among	themselves,	particularly	if	they	
perceived	they	could	obtain	more	favourable	verdicts	through	this	means.	The	fact	
that	Muslim	courts	applied	different	legal	criteria	in	several	aspects	as	the	use	of	
testimonies	from	unbelievers	and	the	validity	of	written	documents	as	legal	proof	
opened	up	the	opportunity	for	litigants	to	exploit	these	divergences	in	their	own	
advantage150.	That	is	seemingly	the	case	of	a	dispute	occurred	in	Alcudia	of	Barbaria	in	
1393-1394.	Joan	Pont,	merchant	of	Mallorca,	had	given	a	certain	amount	of	money	
and	goods	to	Lluis	Bricàs,	his	factor,	who	committed	to	carry	them	to	the	said	city	of	
Alcudia	and	return	back	to	Mallorca	afterwards.	However,	right	after	arriving	to	the	
North	African	port	the	cargo	was	forcibly	seized	by	Pere	and	Joan	Rotlan,	also	of	
Mallorcan	origin,	on	the	grounds	that	the	said	Lluis	owed	them	a	sizeable	amount	of	
money.	Such	a	procedure	was	no	doubt	a	flagrant	violation	of	property	rights	
according	to	Christian	law,	for	the	cargo	Lluis	was	carrying	actually	belonged	to	Joan	
Pont,	who	had	carefully	marked	the	packages	with	his	merchant	sign.	Thus,	if	Pere	and	
Joan	intended	to	succeed	in	their	claim	over	Joan’s	cargo	as	a	means	to	recover	Lluis’	
debts,	their	best	chance	was	to	turn	to	the	Royal	court	of	the	king	of	Garb,	which																																																									
148	AMV,	LM	11,	f.	36	v-37	r.	6th	June	1412.	Transcribed	in	Rubio	Vela,	Epistolari,	p.	173.	149	30th	January	1391,	Bona,	ARM,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	173r-v	(unpublished,	Daniel	Duran).	
150	Francisco	Apellániz	has	shown	that	Muslim	royal	courts	in	Alexandria	and	Damascus	were,	
to	a	certain	degree,	able	to	adapt	their	proceedings	to	the	needs	of	mixed	disputes.	However,	
exploiting	legal	divergences	was	still	possible	and	profitable.	For	instance,	Frankish	litigants	
could	still	not	make	use	of	fellow	Christian	witnesses	before	these	courts.	See	Apellániz,	
Francisco,	‘Judging	the	Franks:	Proof,	Justice,	and	Diversity	in	Late	Medieval	Alexandria	and	
Damascus’,	Comparative	Studies	in	Society	and	History,	58-2	(2016),	pp.	350-378.	
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might	place	hindrances	to	the	use	of	merchant	signs	and	Christian	witnesses	as	valid	
proof	in	the	lawsuit.	Indeed,	that	is	exactly	what	they	did,	probably	taking	further	
advantage	of	their	local	networks	as	long-term	settlers	in	North	Africa.	The	Royal	
lieutenant	of	Mallorca	denounced	such	manoeuvres	and	requested	the	Maghribi	
sultan	to	leave	the	case	to	the	Christian	consuls,	“who	have	expertise	about	these	and	
similar	things”151.	Among	Christian	peers	it	was	considered	unfair	to	bring	cases	to	the	
Muslim	courts,	as	several	Levantine	cases	clearly	make	out152.	
			Unfortunately,	we	know	little	with	regard	to	conflicts	between	Muslim	and	Christian	
merchants	in	the	North	African	ports.	As	happened	elsewhere	in	the	Muslim	world,	
Islamic	courts	adjudicated	all	cases	involving	Muslims,	yet	here	the	Christian	consuls	
could	also	judge	in	litigations	between	one	of	their	fellow	citizens	and	a	Muslim,	if	the	
former	were	the	defendant.	That	was	surely	the	case	in	the	early	fourteenth	century,	
when	Catalans	enjoyed	a	prominent	influence	in	the	area,	yet	it	is	less	clear	whether	
these	clauses	were	still	observed	in	the	next	century,	when	their	political	influence	
diminished	and	consulates	were	organised	along	different	lines153.	
			This	should	have	posed	major	obstacles	on	cross-cultural	trading	relations,	yet	
merchants	certainly	laboured	on	several	ways	to	thwart	their	negative	effects.	A	
relatively	simple	strategy	to	cope	with	these	problems	was	to	make	use	of	fellow	
Muslim	and	Jewish	Valencian	and	Mallorcan	citizens,	as	several	sources	suggest.	For	
instance,	in	a	letter	dated	on	the	21st	of	October	1404	concerning	several	piratic	
attacks,	the	aldermen	of	Valencia	addressed	to	the	Castilian	authorities	to	request	the	
cease	of	piratic	activities	against	Muslim	and	Jewish	merchants,	who	might	be	either	
partners	or	citizens	of	Valencia154.	These	agents,	it	was	said,	were	of	paramount	
importance	for	Christian	Valencians	to	reach	out	the	North	African	markets,	for	it	was	
through	them	that	they	obtained	political	favours,	tax	reductions	and	other	perks155.	
On	the	one	hand,	these	minority	brokers	were	privileged	agents	in	the	North	African	
states,	either	because	of	their	religious	affiliation,	their	trading	contacts	or	their	
political	influence	over	local	officials	and	rulers.	On	the	other	hand,	as	we	have	already	
seen,	Muslim	and	Jewish	fellow	citizens	laid	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Valencian	
and	Mallorcan	Consulates	of	the	Sea,	what	might	have	allowed	easier	enforcement	in	
case	they	returned	home.	The	use	of	local	Jews	and	Muslims	is	also	documented,	yet	
further	archival	research	remains	to	be	done	before	we	are	able	to	draw	a	thicker	
picture	on	the	enforcement	implications	of	this	symbiosis	between	Christian,	Muslim	
and	Jewish.		
																																																								
151	In	the	original:	“que	d’aquestes	coses	e	semblants	han	a	conexer”.	ARM,	AH	66,	f.	109r-v.,	
3rd	January	1394	(unpublished	document,	Daniel	Duran).	
152	Ashtor,	Levant	Trade	in	the	Later	Middle	Ages,	p.	415.	
153	See	Ashtor,	Levant	Trade	in	the	Later	Middle	Ages,	p.	412.		
154	On	the	use	of	fellow	Muslim	citizens,	see	Salicrú	i	Lluch,	R.	‘Mudéjares	y	cristianos	en	el	
comercio	con	Berbería:	quejas	sobre	favoritismo	fiscal	y	acusaciones	de	colaboracionismo	
Mudéjar,	una	reacción	cristiana	a	la	defensiva’,	in	De	mudéjares	y	moriscos:	una	conversion	
forzada,	1	(2003),	pp.	283-302.	
155	In	the	original	document:	“que.ls	christians	mercaders,	per	lur	avantatge,	cerquen	en	terra	
de	moros	juheus	e	altres	moros	que	sien	acostats	al	rey,	ab	favour	dels	quals	lurs	fets	sien	
endreçats,	e	servexen-los	d’alcun	premi,	cor	licit	és	a	cascun	cercar	son	avantatge”.	AMV,	LM	
8,	f.	83	v-84r.	Transcribed	in	Rubio,	Epistolari	de	la	València	medieval,	p.	168.	
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			It	is	difficult	to	assess	whether	these	Maghribi	Christian	consulates	were	recognized	
and	to	what	extent	by	the	public	authorities	of	Valencia,	Mallorca	and	the	Crown	of	
Aragon.	As	far	as	we	know,	when	the	aldermen	of	Valencia	tried	to	obtain	restitutions	
in	case	of	robbery	or	negotiated	the	retrieval	of	the	estate	of	deceased	merchants,	
they	engaged	in	direct	diplomatic	action	with	local	rulers,	without	the	mediation	of	
Christian	consuls,	a	situation	that	stands	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	close	collaboration	in	
these	matters	between	the	Catalan	cities	and	their	overseas	consulates	elsewhere156.	
The	municipal	correspondence	makes	clear	that	the	Valencian	council	was	ignorant	of	
the	role	of	Aymerich	Berart	as	a	consul	in	Tlemcen	before	the	reviewed	dispute	arose.	
Even	the	legitimacy	of	Aymeric’s	verdict	was	seemingly	called	into	question,	up	to	the	
point	that	the	aldermen	demanded	the	lawsuit	to	be	repeated	before	the	consuls	of	
the	sea	in	Valencia157.	A	letter	from	1394,	on	the	contrary,	shows	that	the	Mallorcan	
authorities	might	support	the	jurisdiction	and	privilege	of	the	Christian	consulates,	
particularly	against	interferences	of	the	Muslim	local	authorities.	The	said	letter,	
written	by	the	Royal	lieutenant	and	addressed	to	the	sultan	of	Garb,	requested	him	to	
leave	the	dispute	between	the	Rotlan	brothers,	Lluis	Bricàs	and	Joan	Pont	to	the	
Christian	consul,	on	the	grounds	that	the	latter	was	entitled	to	render	justice	in	such	
cases	“per	privilege	vostre,	costum	antic	e	d’ara”	(by	privilege	of	yours,	old	and	
present	customs)158.	
			Our	sources	leave	the	impression	that	the	number	and	scope	of	these	consulates	
highly	fluctuated	over	time159.	For	the	kingdom	of	Tunis,	there	is	one	“merchant	
consulate”	mentioned	in	Bona	in	1391160,	but	probably	fell	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	
Catalan	consulate	of	Tunis	after	its	re-establishment	in	1406,	for	no	later	information	is	
known	with	respect	to	this	area.	Within	the	kingdom	of	Tlemcen,	several	Christian-
merchant	consulates	are	known:	firstly,	in	Algiers	(1387,	1396161),	Honein	(1389)	and	
Tenes	(1389)162.	In	1407,	the	Christian	consul	in	Tlemcen	was	the	well-known	
Valencian	expatriate	Francesch	de	Montfort163,	while	for	the	lapse	1412-1413	the	
consular	office	was	held	by	his	fellow	countryman	Aymerich	Berart.	It	is	unclear	what	
the	jurisdiction	of	this	consulate	was:	according	to	some	municipal	letters	it	
																																																								
156	As	Daniel	Duran	pointed	me	out	in	private	correspondence,	this	is	not	a	conclusive	proof,	
yet	should	be	highlighted	for	comparison.	
157	AMV,	LM	11,	f.	36	v-37	r.,	in	Rubio,	Epistolari	de	la	València	medieval,	p.	173;	AMV,	g3-11,	
37r-v;	AMV,	LM,	g3-11,	169v-170r.		
158	Such	“old	privilege”	probably	dates	back	to	the	age	of	the	extinguished	Mallorcan	
consulates.	If	so,	this	would	confirm	the	Mallorcan	roots	of	these	Christian	consulates.	3rd	
January	1394,	ARM,	AH	66,	f.	109r-v.	(unpublished,	Daniel	Duran).	
159	This	was	no	doubt	due	to	the	frequent	episodes	of	violence	and	imprisonment	against	
Christians,	what	might	have	forced	them	to	re-organize	their	consulates	every	so	often,	but	
probably	also	to	the	fact	that	such	consulates	had	a	weak	legal	status	and	lacked	strong	
external	support.	160	ARM,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	173r-v.,	30th	January	1391	(Daniel	Duran,	unpublished). 
161	Duran	i	Duelt,	D.	‘Consolats	de	mar	i	consolats	d’ultramar:	la	defensa	de	l’espai	marítim	en	
temps	de	Martí	l’Humà’,	p.	568,	footnote	7.	
162	ARM,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	74r-v.,	1387;	ARM,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	102r.,	30th	August	1389;	ARM,	
AH	Clero	2595,	f.	119r.,	27th	July	1389	(Daniel	Duran,	unpublished).	
163	Duran	i	Duelt,	Ibidem.	
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encompassed	the	whole	kingdom	of	Tlemcen164,	yet	others,	drawn	up	by	the	same	
Council,	present	the	said	Aymerich	as	the	“merchant	consul	in	the	city	of	Tlemcen”,	
suggesting	a	more	restricted	sphere	of	action165.	Our	consular	map	is	further	
complicated	by	the	fact	that	a	consul	is	known	in	Algiers	in	1412,	when	the	whole	
kingdom	of	Tlemcen	was	supposed	to	fall	under	the	jurisdiction	of	Aymeric,	according	
to	the	aforementioned	documents166.	In	1432	there	is	evidence	of	a	“naval	consul”	in	
Oran,	suggesting	that	by	this	time	the	Christian	community	in	this	town	was	not	stable	
enough	to	support	a	consul:	the	office	had	to	be	provided	on	a	temporal	basis	by	the	
commercial	expeditions	departing	from	Valencia	for	the	duration	of	their	ventures167.	
In	Bougie	there	was	surely	another	Christian	consulate,	yet	as	far	as	I	know	our	
references	date	back	to	the	1370s.	With	respect	to	the	area	of	Fez,	all	references	to	
“Christian	and	merchant	consuls”	are	early:	Fez	and	Alcudia	(1386),	Alcudia	(1388,	
1394)	and	Fez	(1387)168.	Instability	in	those	parts	probably	prompted	the	merge	of	all	
the	Maghribi	and	Granadan	consulates	in	1459,	when	the	king	of	Aragon	Juan	II	—
probably	through	the	general	bailiff	of	Valencia—	appointed	Joan	Rosell,	merchant	of	
Valencia,	as	a	general	consul	for	the	kingdoms	of	Granada,	Fez	and	Tlemcen169.	
However,	much	remains	to	be	proven:	we	do	not	know	if	this	Royal	appointment	
meant	the	effective	dissolution	of	the	Christian	consulates,	nor	whether	this	
dissolution	was	the	result	of	Royal	authority	or	rather	the	merchants’	choice.	
	
																																																								
164	For	instance,	the	letter	addressed	to	the	king	of	Tlemcen:	AMV,	LM,	g3-11,	169v-170r.	25th	
January	1413.	
165	In	the	original:	“consol	dels	mercaders	en	la	ciutat	de	Tremicé”.	AMV,	LM	11,	f.	36	v-37	r.,	
transcribed	in	Rubio,	Epistolari	de	la	València	medieval,	p.	173.		
166	Macaire,	Pierre,	Majorque	et	le	commerce	internationale,	p.	194.	
167	Guiral,	Valencia,	puerto	mediterráneo,	p.	85.	
168	ARM,	AH	53,	f.	102r-v,	4th	August	1386;	ARM,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	58r-59v.	15th	August	1387;	
ARMV,	AH	Clero	2595,	f.	105r-v.	4th	August	1388;	ARM,	AH	66,	f.	109r-v.,	3rd	January	1394.	
169	This	Royal	appointment	seemingly	contradicts	the	Barcelonan	monopoly	we	mentioned	
below,	yet	probably	signals	that	the	Catalan	Principality	had	little	interest	in	the	region,	which	
was	mainly	the	area	of	influence	of	Valencians	and	Mallorcans.	For	the	reference,	see:	
Hinojosa	Montalvo,	J.	R.,	‘Las	relaciones	entre	Valencia	y	Granada	durante	el	siglo	XV:	balance	
de	una	investigación’,	in	Estudios	sobre	Málaga	y	el	Reino	de	Granada	en	el	V	Centenario	de	la	
Conquista	(Málaga,	1987)	pp.	83-111.	
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Image	1	-	Map	of	the	North	African	and	Granadan	consulates	(1387-1459).	Based	on	the	sources	
mentioned	in	the	text.	
	
			The	previous	analysis	should	have	made	clear	the	different	contract	enforcement	
strategies	that	were	used	by	the	merchants	of	Valencia	and	Mallorca	in	the	North	
African	sultanates.	They	made	opportunistic	use	of	the	Muslim	courts,	yet	relied	
mainly	on	the	Christian	consulates	to	settle	conflicts	between	peers.	Our	examination	
rises	the	question	as	to	whether	such	Christian	consulates	can	be	regarded	as	open	
access	institutions	that	provided	judicial	and	other	services	to	the	broad	merchant	
community,	in	comparable	terms	as	the	Catalan	consulates	elsewhere.	Some	of	the	
evidence	presented	so	far	might	point	to	such	a	conclusion,	for	a	mix	set	of	merchants	
from	Valencia,	Mallorca,	Castile	and	Italy	are	seen	through	the	consular	documents	
trading	in	these	parts.	And	yet,	the	Maghribi	consulates	were	fundamentally	different.	
They	were	not	only	self-managed	but	also	unaccountable,	for	no	Catalan-Aragonese	
institution	had	the	authority	to	remove	unruly	consuls	from	office	and	appoint	new	
ones.	As	a	consequence,	these	consulates	could	turn	into	corporate	bodies	co-opted	
by	a	minority	of	long-term	settlers,	who	made	use	of	their	connections	with	Christian	
and	Muslim	authorities	to	achieve	more	favourable	verdicts,	as	the	cases	of	Francesch	
de	Montfort	and	the	Rotlan	brothers	suggest.	In	any	case,	we	will	gain	new	insight	by	
comparing	this	model	with	the	strategies	implemented	in	the	other	area	of	Valencian	
influence:	the	Nasrid	kingdom	of	Granada.	
	
Valencians	in	the	kingdom	of	Granada	
	
	
			In	the	early	fifteenth	century,	the	kingdom	of	Granada	was	a	major	supplier	of	
specialized	goods	as	silk,	sugar	and	dried	fruits.	The	two	largest	foreign	merchant	
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communities	were	the	Genoese,	who	established	their	headquarters	in	Malaga,	and	
the	Valencians,	better	rooted	in	Almeria	yet	present	in	the	three	major	cities,	including	
the	Granadan	capital	itself170.	Despite	endemic	reprisals,	extortions	and	corruption,	
Valencians	managed	to	build	up	dense	networks	around	the	main	Granadan	trade	
centres,	making	extensive	use	of	factors	and	even	trading	across	boundaries	with	local	
Muslims171.	This	success,	which	is	already	evident	before	mid-fifteenth	century,	is	
particularly	striking	given	that	Valencian	merchants	were	discriminated	in	several	ways	
and	lacked	the	support	of	strong	consular	institutions	all	through	this	period.		
	
	
	
Image	2	–	Fragment	of	a	letter	addressed	to	the	king	of	Granada	(AMV)		
			It	is	difficult	to	quantify	their	presence	by	this	time,	yet	later	data	suggests	that	
Valencians	were	at	least	as	numerous	as	the	Genoese.	In	1472,	more	than	80	
Valencian	merchants	were	imprisoned	in	Almeria	in	reprisal	for	some	corsair	attacks	
against	subjects	of	the	Nasrid	sultan.	Fifteen	years	later,	when	Malaga	had	already	
been	taken	over	by	the	Castilians,	there	were	29	Valencians	residing	and	naturalized	as	
citizens	of	Malaga,	a	figure	that	should	be	raised	including	factors,	procurators	and	
relatives	residing	there	for	the	duration	of	their	business	and	contractual	obligations.	
By	contrast,	mid-fifteenth	century	reprisals	against	the	Genoese	show	no	more	than	
fifty	Ligurians	imprisoned.	If	accurate,	these	events	might	confirm	that	Valencians	
were	already	the	largest	foreign	merchant	community	by	the	beginning	of	the	second	
half	of	the	century172.	
			The	status	of	the	subjects	of	the	king	of	Aragon,	and	particularly	the	Valencians,	
evolved	in	a	peculiar	way	throughout	the	late	fourteenth	and	the	early	fifteenth	
century.	In	1392,	the	Valencian	merchants	with	interests	in	Granada,	supported	by	the	
city	council,	complained	before	the	Aragonese	king	that	they	were	being	forbidden	to	
take	gold	out	of	the	Nasrid	kingdom,	a	prohibition	that	did	not	apply	to	the	Genoese.	
The	merchants	urged	the	king	to	take	advantage	of	the	truce	negotiations	that	were	
being	carried	out	with	the	sultan	to	remove	such	regulations	and	obtain	further	
																																																								170	Salicrú,	‘The	Catalano-Aragonese	commercial	presence	in	the	sultanate	of	Granada	during	
the	reign	of	Alfonso	the	Magnanimous’,	p.	296,	footnote	34;	Salicrú,	Roser,	‘La	Corona	de	
Aragón	y	Génova	en	la	Granada	del	siglo	XV’,	L’expansió	catalana	a	la	Mediterrània	a	la	Baixa	
Edat	Mitjana,	Anuario	de	Estudios	Medievales,	anexo	36	(1999),	pp.	121-144.	
171	An	overview	can	be	found	at	Salicrú,	‘The	Catalano-Aragonese	commercial	presence’.	172	Salicrú,	Ibidem,	p.	295;	Ruiz	Povedano,	J.	M.,	‘El	consulado	catalán	de	Málaga	en	época	de	
los	Reyes	Católicos’,	En	la	España	medieval,	10	(1987),	pp.	423.	
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privileges173.	The	following	treaty	of	1392	seemingly	met	such	demands,	yet	
discussions	preceding	the	1405	truce	make	out	that	the	Aragonese	were	still	being	
discriminated.	Throughout	the	following	discussions,	the	Valencian	bailiff	denounced	
Genoese	favouritism	and	claimed	for	the	removal	of	the	mahona,	a	tax	applicable	only	
to	Catalan	commerce.	The	Catalans	were	double	taxed	even	when	their	merchandise	
had	not	been	sold,	they	were	compelled	to	keep	written	record	of	every	transaction	
and	in	case	a	debtor	presented	a	“letter	of	poverty”,	Catalan	creditors	could	not	claim	
back	their	money.	Furthermore,	in	case	of	dispute	they	were	liable	to	be	brought	
before	the	qadi	court	instead	of	the	Muslim	mercantile	officials.	The	final	treatise	of	
1405	granted	the	Catalans	personal	freedom	and	security,	as	well	as	explicit	
permission	to	withdraw	gold,	yet	discrimination	seemingly	remained,	as	none	of	the	
clauses	suggests	otherwise174.		
			Valencian	merchants	in	Granada	challenge	the	assumption	that	strong	consular	
institutions	were	indispensable	to	support	successful	mercantile	networks	abroad.	The	
ever-present	merchant	elite	seemingly	did	not	turn	to	consuls	to	settle	their	disputes,	
and	there	is	hardly	any	evidence	of	disputes	brought	before	them.	One	might	think	
that,	since	most	Valencian	merchants	were	just	short-term	visitors	in	the	realms	of	
Granada,	they	preferred	to	settle	their	conflicts	before	the	Consulate	of	the	Sea	back	
home.	This	assumption	is	partially	true	—most	conflicts	regarding	Granadan	
businesses	might	have	been	settled	in	Valencia—,	yet	fails	to	account	for	the	several	
dozens	of	Valencian	merchants	settled	permanently	or	for	long	periods	in	the	Nasrid	
kingdom,	for	whom	having	strong	consulates	applying	Christian	law	might	have	been	a	
valuable	service.	If	that	was	never	the	case	it	is	due	to	the	lack	of	support	on	the	part	
of	the	homeland	public	institutions	and	the	weak	legal	status	of	Catalan	consulates	vis-
à-vis	local	authorities.	Before	1392,	Catalans	were	obliged	to	brought	their	cases	
before	the	qadi	court,	what	arguably	discouraged	the	development	of	a	consulate.	
Following	treaties	between	Aragon	and	Granada	seemingly	showed	no	interest	in	
defining	the	privileges	and	rights	of	the	Catalan	consulates,	which	predictably	reduced	
the	enforcement	capabilities	of	these	institutions175.		
			A	Catalan	consulate	in	Granada	is	documented,	yet	probably	fulfilled	a	limited	role	
related	to	the	drawing	up	of	documents,	the	recording	of	transactions	and	the	
transmission	of	juridical	information	to	be	used	in	the	Valencian	Consulate	for	the	
resolution	of	disputes.	The	only	reference	to	the	workings	of	this	consulate	dates	from	
1418,	when	the	king	Alfonso	V	requested	the	Catalan	consul	in	the	city	of	Granada	to	
take	testimony	of	several	merchants	with	regard	a	lawsuit	held	in	Valencia.	The	said	
consul	is	referred	as	“nostro	consuli	mercatorum	cathalanorum	pro	nobis	in	Granata”,	
																																																								
173	15th	July,	1392,	AMV,	LM	5,	f.	130r-v.,	transcribed	in	Rubio,	Epistolari	de	la	València	
medieval,	p.	139.	
174	López,	La	Corona	de	Aragón	y	el	Magreb	en	el	siglo	XIV,	pp.	190-192.	
175	It	is	interesting	to	compare	this	with	the	preliminary	negotiations	between	Granada	and	the	
Serenissima	regarding	the	establishment	of	a	Venetian	consulate	in	the	area,	which	was	
agreed	to	have	a	full	set	of	privileges	and	guarantees:	see	Fábregas,	Adela,	‘Acercamientos	y	
acuerdos	comerciales	entre	Granada	y	Venecia	al	filo	de	1400’,	in	Anuario	de	Estudios	
Medievales,	40	(2010),	pp.	643-664.	
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suggesting	a	probable	Royal	election176.	The	next	reference	to	a	Granadan	consul	
comes	forty	years	later,	in	1459,	when	the	Valencian	merchant	Joan	Rosell,	settled	in	
Almeria,	was	appointed	by	the	king	as	general	consul	for	the	kingdoms	of	Granada,	Fez	
and	Tlemen,	as	we	already	saw	in	the	previous	chapter.	As	far	as	we	are	concerned,	no	
further	information	is	available	on	these	consulates.		
			Their	diplomatic	role	must	have	been	also	limited,	for	when	the	Crown	or	the	Council	
of	Valencia	needed	someone	to	intercede	before	the	sultan	on	behalf	of	fellow	
nationals,	they	turned	to	the	merchant	community	as	a	whole	or	to	prominent	
individual	businessmen,	not	to	the	consul.	In	November	1420,	after	a	Mallorcan	vessel	
had	been	captured	by	the	Genoese	in	the	port	of	Malaga	with	the	connivance	of	the	
Granadan	authorities,	the	Monarchs	asked	Joan	Martorell,	“merchant	in	the	city	of	
Malaga”,	to	do	everything	in	his	power	to	intercede	before	the	sultan	and	release	the	
prisoners	and	their	goods177.	Indeed,	Joan	and	other	elite	merchants	residing	in	those	
parts	probably	played	the	role	of	informal	consuls,	in	a	similar	manner	as	Esteban	
Bonora	will	do	at	the	end	of	the	century.	It	is	not	implausible	to	venture	that	they	
might	host	Catalan	merchants,	provide	storage	facilities	and	even	act	as	brokers	on	
their	connationals’	behalf.	At	the	turn	of	the	century,	the	said	Esteban	Bonora	would	
even	be	accused	by	Malagan	citizens	of	behaving	as	the	chief	of	the	Catalan	
community,	controlling	their	commerce	and	the	production	and	trade	of	anchovies178.		
			In	the	kingdom	of	Granada,	Valencians	customarily	resorted	to	Muslim	courts	to	
settle	not	only	mixed	cases,	but	also	disputes	among	fellow	Valencians	and	Christians.	
This	probably	signals	not	only	the	consulates’	shortcomings	in	the	area,	but	also	the	
willingness	of	Islamic	courts	to	adapt	to	Christian	demands	to	a	certain	degree.	The	
formalist	approach	of	the	qadi	courts,	which	only	accepted	righteous	witnesses	as	
valid	testimony	and	ruled	out	the	use	of	written	documents,	gave	way	to	the	Royal	
Nasrid	courts,	whose	proceedings	were	better	suited	to	serve	non-Muslim	litigants179.	
A	prominent	example	of	the	use	of	these	courts	is	provided	by	the	correspondence	of	
the	Valencian	aldermen	in	1416.	In	this	year,	Luis	de	Eixarchs	and	his	sons	decided	to	
take	legal	action	against	Pere	Montblanch,	their	factor	in	the	city	of	Granada,	for	he	
has	been	proved	to	be	wasting	their	capitals	and	concealing	merchandise.	Instead	of	
turning	to	a	Christian	consul,	they	remarkably	appealed	to	“the	sultan,	his	judges	and	
officials”.	It	is	not	clear	why	the	Eixarchs	family	did	so,	yet	it	is	sure	that	the	Muslim	
court	was	more	capable	to	enforce	its	verdicts	than	its	Christian	counterpart.	In	any	
case,	Lluis	de	Eixarchs	carried	out	the	case	and	even	obtained	letters	of	
recommendation	from	the	Valencian	council	to	further	support	his	allegations	before	
the	sultan	—	a	surprising	move	taking	into	account	that	the	defendant	was	also	a	
citizen	from	Valencia180.	Such	provisions	might	indicate,	on	the	one	hand,	concerns																																																									
176	Again,	it	is	not	be	implausible	to	hypothesize	that	the	Valencian	bailiff	could	have	made	
such	an	appointment	on	behalf	of	the	king,	given	his	ubiquitous	role	in	the	Granadan	affairs.	
For	the	document,	see	Salicrú,	‘Documents’,	doc.	32,	pp.	53-54.	
177	Salicrú,	‘The	Catalano-Aragonese	commercial	presence’,	p.	299.	
178	Ruiz	Povedano,	‘El	consulado	catalán	de	Málaga	en	época	de	los	Reyes	Católicos’,	pp.	425-
426.	179	Francisco	Apéllaniz	reported	a	similar	process	by	the	same	time	in	the	Mamluk	cities	of	
Alexandria	and	Damascus:	see	Apellániz,	‘Judging	the	Franks:	Proof,	Justice,	and	Diversity	in	
Late	Medieval	Alexandria	and	Damascus’,	pp.	353-357,	375.	
180	AMV,	LM,	g3-13,	153r-v.	
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regarding	the	reliability	of	the	Nasrid	officials,	but	also	the	need	to	prove	the	
righteousness	of	oneself	before	the	Muslim	judges181.	The	attitude	of	the	Valencian	
aldermen	in	this	respect	is	worth	commenting.	Instead	of	requesting	the	sultan	to	
leave	the	issue	to	the	Christian	consul,	as	did	the	Mallorcan	lieutenant	before	the	king	
of	Garb	in	1394	(see	the	previous	chapter),	they	seemingly	took	for	granted	the	
sultan’s	role	as	the	judge	for	the	Christians	in	Granada,	limiting	themselves	to	support	
the	claim	of	their	fellow	citizens.	We	do	not	know	what	the	outcome	of	this	trial	was,	
yet	Pere	Montblanch	appears	two	years	latter	giving	testimony	before	the	Catalan	
consul	in	Granada,	suggesting	he	was	a	long-term	resident	in	the	Nasrid	capital182.		
			Further	evidence	supports	the	idea	that	Muslim	courts	judged	and	even	punished	
Valencian	merchants	in	the	Nasrid	kingdom.	In	June	1416	we	know	that	the	aldermen	
of	Valencia	tried	to	intercede	before	the	sultan	to	release	Anthoni	Taraçona,	a	
prosperous	businessman	in	the	past	who	had	been	imprisoned	by	reason	of	his	
numerous	debts183.	We	do	not	know	the	identity	of	the	plaintiffs,	yet	by	this	point	is	
apparent	that	Royal	courts	were	customarily	used	to	settle	mixed	conflicts,	whether	
involving	Muslims,	Christians	or	connationals.	In	November	1455,	Ferrando	Eiximenez,	
Valencian,	sued	a	Genoese	operator	residing	in	Almeria	before	the	sultan,	his	judges	
and	officials	on	the	grounds	that	the	said	Genoese	had	refused	to	pay	back	some	
money184.	These	courts	might	have	been	the	only	means	to	enforce	contracts	when	
dealing	with	long-term	Christian	residents	as	the	ones	we	have	just	reviewed,	since	
they	could	costlessly	evade	the	authority	of	their	national	consuls.	Some	of	them	
might	be	what	in	the	Levant	were	called	fazolati:	Christian	merchants	that	had	
obtained	from	the	Muslim	authorities	the	status	of	permanent	residents,	but	without	
becoming	subjects	of	the	sultan185.		
			Facing	a	context	defined	by	weak	consulates	and	hostile	local	institutions,	Valencian	
merchants	pursued	several	strategies	in	order	to	carry	out	their	businesses	and	
enforce	contracts.	In	particular,	they	achieved	a	high	level	of	political	influence	and	
individual	privileges	by	entering	into	credit	relations	with	the	Nasrid	officials	and	the	
sultan	himself.	In	1424,	the	King	of	Granada	owed	Galceran	d’Eixarch,	brother	of	the	
aforementioned	Luis	de	Eixarchs,	4000	gold	florins;	two	years	later	we	know	that	the	
Royal	Treasurer	owed	him	a	sizable	amount	of	money	dating	back	to	seven	or	eight	
years	before.	These	kind	of	strategies	are	probably	on	the	roots	of	the	silk	monopoly	
achieved	by	six	Valencian	merchants	in	1417.	The	sultan	granted	Lluis	and	Galceran	
d’Eixarch,	Lluis	Granollers,	Joan	Baiona,	Joan	Martorell	and	Pere	d’Aries	the	monopoly	
to	export	silk	from	his	realms	186.	Such	a	privilege	seemingly	divided	the	institutions	of	
Valencia:	while	the	aldermen	supported	the	monopolists,	the	bailiff	denounced	their	
schemes	as	an	aggression	against	the	bulk	of	the	Christian,	Muslim	and	Jewish	citizens	
of	Valencia	who	traded	in	those	parts	and	whose	main	interest	was	precisely	the	
																																																								
181	Apellániz	has	shown	that	selling	verdicts	was	common	practice	in	the	Medieval	Levant:	
Apellániz,	Ibidem,	p.	373.	182	Salicrú,	Roser,	Documents	per	a	la	història	de	Granada	del	regnat	d’Alfons	el	Magnànim,	
1416-1458	(Barcelona,	1999),	doc.	32,	pp.	53-54.	
183	AMV,	LM	g3-13,	120v.	
184	Salicrú,	‘The	Catalano-Aragonese	commercial	presence’,	p.	305.	
185	Ashtor,	Ibidem,	p.	400.	
186	Salicrú,	Ibidem,	pp.	296-297,	298.	
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Granadan	silk187.	However,	elite	merchants	kept	obtaining	privileges	in	detriment	of	
the	merchant	community	as	a	whole:	in	1426,	Francesc	d’Aries,	probably	brother	of	
the	aforementioned	Pere,	was	granted	the	monopoly	over	salt	imports.	These	elite	
merchants	and	lineages	are	the	ones	that	appear	most	frequently	in	the	sources,	and	
many	of	them	have	been	long	established	in	the	Granadan	markets.	In	1380,	for	
instance,	Joan	and	Lluis	d’Eixarch	already	appear	trading	in	Granada	through	a	6800	
pounds	worth	society,	the	biggest	one	recorded	all	throughout	the	period.	In	the	1405-
1412	period,	Lluis	appears	more	than	twenty	times	as	guarantor	of	ships	bound	for	
Almeria,	or	from	Almeria	to	Malaga.	In	1415,	several	letters	mention	Lluis	and	his	sons	
residing	in	Malaga,	and	in	the	summer	1421	he	is	recorded	living	in	Malaga188.	
			Merchants	seemingly	turned	to	their	homeland	royal	authorities	to	further	enforce	
contracts	in	Granada.	In	1427,	Joan	d’Eixarc	is	recommended	by	the	Monarchs	before	
the	sultan	to	recover	some	debts.	Likewise,	in	1430	Alfonso	V	issued	letters	of	
recommendation	on	behalf	of	Joan	Martorell,	Francesc	Torrents	and	their	factors	in	
order	to	claim	back	some	credits189.	In	December	1443,	when	Joan	Pi	of	Mallorca	
failed	to	recover	a	debt	from	a	Granadan	Muslim,	Mohamat	Algazi,	Queen	Maria	was	
requested	to	intercede	on	behalf	of	her	subject	before	the	prince	of	Granada190.	The	
royal	bailiff	of	Valencia	held	a	prominent	role	here	as	well,	as	shown	in	a	letter	from	
January	1457	in	which	he	requested	the	sultan	for	formal	acknowledgment	of	several	
debts	that	his	Muslim	subjects	had	contracted	with	Valencian	merchants191.		
			Many	details	remain	to	be	known	regarding	the	enforcement	strategies	
underpinning	the	Valencian	establishment	in	Granada.	Nevertheless,	it	is	apparent	that	
Catalan	consulates	kept	very	low	profile	regarding	contract	enforcement.	Instead,	
Valencian	merchants	—especially	the	upper	class—	turned	to	Muslim	courts,	which	
rose	in	importance	as	they	were	increasingly	used	to	settle	both	mixed	cases	and	
disputes	between	fellow	Valencians	and	Christians.	Insofar	as	Nasrid	institutions	were	
hostile	or	unreliable,	Valencian	elite	merchants	developed	individual	strategies	based	
on	credit	relations	vis-à-vis	the	local	rulers	and	officials,	further	reinforced	by	the	
personal	support	of	the	royal	and	municipal	authorities	from	Aragon	and	Valencia,	all	
which	greatly	enhanced	their	commercial	position	and	their	access	to	enforcement	
institutions.	
	
	
II.3.	The	Valencian	case	compared	
	
	
																																																								187	Salicrú,	Roser,	‘La	treva	de	1418	amb	Granada:	la	recuperació	de	la	tradició	
catalanoaragonesa’,	Anuario	de	estudios	medievales,	27,	2	(1997),	p.	2007.	
188	Salicrú,	‘The	Catalano-Aragonese	commercial	presence’,	pp.	295,	297.	
189	Ibidem,	pp.	298-300.	
190	Ibidem,	p.	307.	191	Ruzafa	García,	Manuel,	‘Las	relaciones	económicas	entre	los	mudéjares	valencianos	y	el	
reino	de	Granada	en	el	siglo	XV’,	Relaciones	exteriores	del	Reino	de	Granada:	IV	Coloquio	de	
Historia	Medieval	Andaluza	(1988),	p.	359.	
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Barcelona	
	
	
In	the	period	we	are	dealing	with,	Valencia	was	approaching	Barcelona	in	terms	of	
population	and	probably	also	in	wealth192.	However,	the	city	never	achieved	levels	of	
mercantile	development	comparable	to	Barcelona:	her	firms	remained	smaller	and	
seemingly	made	less	use	of	citizen	investment	to	raise	capital	funds	(see	part	I).	
Valencia’s	Golden	Age	seemingly	owed	as	much	to	the	settlement	of	foreign	merchant	
communities,	particularly	Italians,	as	it	did	to	the	appearance	of	a	local	mercantile	
class193.		
			The	challenge	of	explaining	why	Valencia	did	never	pick	up	the	baton	of	commercial	
hegemony	after	Barcelona’s	demise	would	require	a	deep	understanding	of	several	
intertwined	factors.	While	it	would	be	premature	to	venture	very	far	in	providing	an	
answer,	some	of	the	arguments	developed	here	suggest	new	ways	of	approaching	the	
question.	At	this	point	it	should	already	be	clear	that	Valencian	and	Barcelonan	
contract	enforcement	institutions	differed	in	several	significant	ways	with	respect	to	
their	areas	of	predilection	—which	is	to	say,	the	areas	in	which	their	merchants	had	a	
comparative	advantage—.	Barcelona	developed	a	consular	network	in	which	consular	
appointment,	removal	and	jurisdiction	were	well	defined	and	often	written	down	in	
regulations	and	treatises	with	foreign	rulers.	Partially	because	of	this,	cooperation	
between	her	Consulate	of	the	Sea	(also	Mallorca’s,	Valencia’s	and	others)	and	overseas	
consulates	were	enhanced.	Catalan	consulates	certainly	experienced	episodes	of	
turmoil,	bribery	and	extortion,	but	in	the	term	of	a	few	years	the	Council	of	Barcelona	
or	the	Monarchy	usually	removed	unruly	consuls	from	office	and	appointed	new	
ones194.	In	sum,	Barcelona’s	consular	network	provided	low	cost	contract	enforcement	
to	the	broad	merchant	community,	stretching	from	Bruges	to	the	route	of	the	isles	and	
the	Levant195.		
			Conversely,	the	consular	network	in	Valencia’s	area	of	influence	was	self-managed,	
unaccountable	and,	particularly	in	the	case	of	Granada,	weak.	It	is	unclear	what	the	
origin	of	this	situation	was,	but	the	outcome	is	certain:	Valencian	merchants	turned	to	
individual	strategies	based	on	political	influence	on	local	governments196,	semi-private																																																									
192	The	prominent	role	of	Valencia	as	the	main	financer	of	Alfonso	V’s	military	campaigns	in	the	
Mediterranean	is	an	eloquent	testimony	to	this.	See	Ryder,	Alan,	Alfonso	the	Magnanimous:	
king	of	Aragon,	Naples	and	Sicily,	1396-1458	(Oxford,	1990);	Epstein,	‘An	island	for	itself’,	p.	
381.	
193	Igual,	David,	‘Los	agentes	de	la	banca	internacional:	cambistas	y	mercaderes	en	Valencia’,	
Revista	d’Història	Medieval,	11	(2000),	pp.	105-138.	
194	AMV,	LM,	g3-13,	130r;	Ashtor,	op.	cit.,	p.	232;	Carrère,	op.	cit.,	p.	126;	Duran,	‘Monarquia,	
consellers	i	mercaders’.	
195	This	network	can	be	characterized	as	an	“open	access	order”	in	terms	of	North,	D.	C.,	
Wallis,	J.	J.,	and	Weingast,	B.	R.,	Violence	and	Social	Orders:	A	Conceptual	Framework	for	
Interpreting	Recorded	Human	History	(Cambridge,	2013),	pp.	110-115.		
196	It	should	be	noted	that	Barcelonan	merchants	also	engaged	in	political	intrigue	and	rent-
seeking	abroad,	sometimes	to	the	detriment	of	fellow	nationals.	However,	these	practices	
could	not	hamper	so	much	the	access	to	contract	enforcement	when	strong	consulates	were	
available	for	the	broad	community.	See	the	case	of	the	Barcelonan	Rafael	Vines,	who	entered	
into	credit	relations	with	the	sultans	of	Tunis	and	in	1446	was	granted	a	monopoly	over	choral	
(Carrère,	op.	cit.,	p.	148).		
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consulates	and	the	special	support	from	municipal	and	royal	officials	as	a	means	to	
improve	personal	security	and	contract	enforcement.	This	framework	actually	
supported	the	expansion	of	commerce	towards	Granada	and	the	Maghreb,	but	
plausibly	limited	its	growth	potential	in	the	long	term.	Individual	solutions	to	contract	
enforcement	were	clearly	much	costly	and	far	from	the	reach	of	the	wide	base	of	
merchants.	Well-connected	elite	businessmen,	as	Francesch	de	Montfort	in	Tlemcen	
and	the	several	silk	and	salt	monopolists	in	Granada,	enjoyed	better	access	to	contract	
enforcement	institutions	and	could	reach	higher	levels	of	commercial	organisation,	yet	
this	framework	hampered	the	appearance	of	a	wide	base	of	merchants	who	could	
have	made	good	use	of	Valencia’s	comparative	advantage	towards	Granada	and	
Barbaria	to	expand	their	businesses,	reinvest	and	capitalize	Valencia’s	merchant	
economy.		
			It	is	true	that	there	is	no	substantial	difference	in	average	capital,	duration	and	
number	of	partners	between	the	Valencian	societies	established	to	trade	in	
Granada/Maghreb	and	those	established	to	trade	in	areas	in	which	a	strong	consular	
network	existed,	as	Italy	or	Bruges197.	However,	these	figures	might	mean	that	similar	
contract	enforcement	outcomes	had	been	reached	through	different	strategies,	which	
nevertheless	had	different	implications	for	long-term	commercial	growth.	Only	a	
network	approach	to	the	individuals	involved	in	these	companies	might	cast	further	
light	in	the	future	regarding	this	hypothesis.		
	
	
The	Italian	republics:	Genoa,	Venice	and	Florence	
	
	
Avner	Greif	developed	a	model	for	contract	enforcement	in	mid-twelfth	century	
Genoa	that	is	worth	reviewing	here	on	the	light	of	the	Valencian	experience.	Based	on	
the	analysis	of	the	cartulary	of	John	the	Scribe	(1155-1164),	Greif	proposed	a	private-
order,	reputation	based	institution	as	the	basis	for	the	early	commercial	development	
of	Genoa198.	According	to	him,	contractual	arrangements	in	the	Superba	were	defined	
by	the	presence	of	two	distinct	classes:	on	the	one	hand,	a	group	of	rich	sedentary	
investors,	typically	members	of	the	urban	oligarchy	or	nobles	themselves;	on	the	
other,	a	class	of	poor	travelling	merchants.	The	former	would	tend	to	confer	large	
sums	to	a	few	merchants,	committing	to	finance	them	for	prolonged	periods	of	time.	
The	promise	of	repeated	dealings	with	the	same	investors,	and	the	fact	that	merchants	
were	rewarded	above	their	alternative	occupation	available,	enabled	them	to	commit	
ex	ante	not	to	breach	contracts	ex	post.	The	Genoese	Republic	further	reinforced	
private	reputation	in	two	ways:	in	the	first	place,	it	held	merchants	and	their	families’	
property	liable	for	any	contractual	breach;	on	the	second,	it	established	contract	
registration	facilities	in	the	main	trading	centres	so	as	to	detect	when	contracts	had																																																									
197	See	the	table	provided	in	Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	de	Valencia	en	el	siglo	XV,	pp.	103-
104.	
198	Greif,	Avner,	‘Cultural	Beliefs	and	the	Organization	of	Society:	A	Historical	and	Theoretical	
Reflection	on	Collectivist	and	Individualist	Societies’,	Journal	of	Political	Economy,	103,	5	
(1994),	pp.	937-938;	Greif,	Avner,	Institutions	and	the	Path	to	the	Modern	Economy:	Lessons	
from	Medieval	Trade	(New	York,	2006),	chapters	8	and	9.	
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been	breached,	measure	the	extent	of	the	violation	and	impose	penalties	on	the	
violators199.	In	relation	to	the	Valencian	case,	however,	there	is	no	evidence	of	such	a	
system,	at	least	not	in	the	period	we	are	dealing	with.	Firstly,	the	Genoese	approach	
implied	the	existence	of	a	class	of	rich	investors	hiring	the	services	of	merchants	of	
relatively	low	status	who	had	fewer	options	than	complying	with	their	masters.	Far	
from	that,	we	have	already	seen	that	Valencian	factors	would	every	so	often	invest	in	
the	enterprises	they	had	been	trusted,	and	rich	merchants	managed	to	attract	
investments	from	fellow	colleges200.	Even	though	Valencia	lagged	behind	Barcelona	in	
this	respect,	the	city	also	witnessed	the	development	of	financial	markets	in	which	
wide	sectors	of	the	population	could	invest	their	savings,	and	capitalists	seemingly	
diversified	their	investments	among	several	different	partners201.	There	is	certainly	no	
patron	system	that	might	resemble	that	of	early	Genoa.	Furthermore,	families	do	not	
seem	to	have	been	liable	in	case	of	contract	breach	unless	contractually	specified.		
			Drawing	on	the	surviving	trading	documents	for	the	period	between	1021	and	1261,	
Yadira	González	de	Lara	has	proposed	a	different	model	for	medieval	Venice202.	
According	to	her,	contract	enforcement	in	the	Serenissima	relied	on	a	public-order	yet	
reputation	based	institution.	It	was	public-order	in	the	sense	that	the	state	generated	
the	rents	required	to	motivate	a	merchant	to	keep	affiliation	with	Venice,	gathered	the	
information	needed	to	detect	a	contractual	breach,	and	punished	a	merchant	if	he	
cheated.	It	was	reputation-based	in	the	sense	that	the	merchant	was	motivated	to	
submit	to	the	Venetian	authorities	and	comply	with	his	contractual	obligations	not	
only	due	to	the	threat	of	legal	sanctions,	which	were	difficult	to	enforce	in	case	he	
chose	to	scape	to	another	jurisdiction,	but	also	of	losing	his	reputation	with	the	state	
and	thus	access	to	state-generated	rents.	Accordingly,	the	Republic	of	San	Marco	
adopted	several	means	to	preserve	per-citizen	rents.	Firstly,	non-Venetians	were	
denied	commercial	access	to	its	colonial	empire;	Venetian	citizens	were	even	
forbidden	to	act	as	middlemen	for	foreigners	in	this	regard.	Secondly,	the	cost	of	
acquiring	the	Venetian	citizenship	was	steadily	raised.	In	third	place,	overseas	capital	
investment	was	legally	restricted,	so	as	to	further	insure	that	rents	were	kept	high.																																																									
199	It	comes	as	a	remarkable	fact	that,	despite	the	heterogeneous	and	erratic	character	of	their	
empire,	Genoese	colonies	always	stuck	to	Genoese	law,	which	each	successive	podestà	and	
consul	swore,	on	taking	office,	to	uphold.	There	is	a	good	overview	on	this	at	Fernández-
Armesto,	F.	Before	Columbus:	exploration	and	colonisation	from	the	Mediterranean	to	the	
Atlantic,	1229-1492	(London,	1987),	p.	104.	See	also	Greif,	Avner,	‘The	fundamental	problem	
of	exchange:	A	research	agenda	in	Historical	Institutional	Analysis’,	European	Review	of	
Economic	History,	vol.	4,	3	(2000),	pp.	269-270;	North,	D.	C.	Institutions,	institutional	change	
and	economic	performance,	p.	58.	
200	At	the	turn	of	the	fourteenth	century,	the	share	of	outsiders	investment	seems	to	increase:	
Cruselles,	Los	comerciantes	valencianos	del	siglo	XV,	p.	112.	Factors	might	sometimes	provide	
some	capital	to	the	society.	That’s	the	case	of	Johan	de	Valldemia,	who	provides	283	p.	to	a	
Barcelonan	company	in	1411,	and	at	the	same	times	engages	as	salaried	factor	of	the	company	
in	Cagliari	for	the	period	of	one	year	(Carrère,	op.	cit.,	p.	612,	footnote	3).	
201	On	the	other	hand,	Cruselles	has	convincingly	proved	that	bill	of	exchange	networks	in	
Valencia	implied	a	wide	array	of	merchants	who	had	no	personal	knowledge	of	each	other	
(Cruselles,	Ibidem,	p.	187).	
202	The	following	explanation	is	entirely	based	on	González	de	Lara,	Y.	‘The	secret	of	Venetian	
success:	a	public-order,	reputation-based	institution’,	European	Review	of	Economic	History,	
vol.	12,	3	(2008),	pp.	247-285.	
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Besides,	a	network	of	colonial	governors,	overseas	consuls	and	public	officials	at	home,	
along	with	the	later	introduction	of	a	system	of	state	convoy	galleys,	provided	
information	on	market	conditions	and	possible	cheating203.	Since	long-term	personal	
relations	between	principals	and	agents	were	not	necessary	in	such	an	environment,	
no	patron	system	in	the	Genoese	fashion	is	found	here.	Resembling	what	we	found	for	
the	Valencian	case,	we	find	many	investors	per	merchant	and	many	merchants	per	
investor204.		
			It	is	worth	noting	that	the	Venetian	model	went	on	wide	beyond	the	period	studied	
by	González	de	Lara,	reaching	the	epoch	of	Valencian	ascendancy	dealt	with	in	this	
paper205.	As	we	have	already	seen,	there	is	evidence	suggesting	the	hypothesis	that	a	
resembling	public-order,	reputation	based	institution	lend	support	to	the	Catalan	
expansion,	in	particular	along	the	route	of	the	isles.	Even	though	Catalans	never	
restricted	access	or	investment	to	their	colonial	empire	and	letters	of	citizenship	were	
easily	granted206,	overseas	privileges	made	Catalano-Aragonese	citizenship	a	valuable	
asset	and	allowed	merchants	to	commit	ex	ante	not	to	flee	ex	post207.	However,	this	
explanation	does	not	suffice	to	explain	contract	enforcement	for	Valencian	commerce.	
In	the	first	place,	because	Valencians	extensively	entered	into	contracts	with	
foreigners,	whether	Castilian,	Italian	or	Muslim,	who	faced	a	very	different	set	of	
incentives	—many	Granadan	Muslims,	as	we	have	seen,	tried	to	cheat	Christian	
merchants	via	different	strategies.	Secondly,	because	Catalano-Aragonese	citizenship	
was	not	equally	valuable	everywhere:	in	Maghreb	and	Granada,	the	subjects	of	the	
Aragonese	king	enjoyed	no	distinctive	privileges	and	many	Valencians	might	be	
tempted	to	become	fazolati.		
			The	case	of	Florence	is	particularly	interesting,	for	by	the	early	fifteenth	century	the	
Florentine	government	granted	insufficient	institutional	support	to	its	merchants	
abroad,	and	the	nazione	was	subject	to	little	regulation	either.	In	fact,	it	counted	only	
two	overseas	communities	—Bruges	and	Naples—	that	matched	the	standards	of	
organized	merchant	nations.	Florentine	businessmen	tended	to	conceal	their	activities	
under	other	flags	in	order	to	access	foreign	privileges	or	consular	protection,	
particularly	Pisan	or	Genoese	—and	they	did	so	in	the	Maghreb	too—.	In	a	way,	the	
Florentine	approach	resembles	the	individualist	strategies	pursued	by	elite	Valencian																																																									
203	Pezzolo,	Luciano,	‘The	via	italiana	to	capitalism’,	in	Neal,	L.,	and	Williamson,	J.	G.,	The	rise	of	
capitalism,	from	ancient	origins	to	1848	(Cambridge,	2014),	pp.	283-284.		
204	See	the	chart	displayed	in	González	de	Lara,	Y.	‘The	secret	of	Venetian	success…’,	p.	40.		
205	See,	for	instance,	Lane,	Frederich,	Venice:	a	maritime	republic	(Baltimore,	1973),	pp.	337-
352.	
206	Narbona,	‘Valencia,	emporio	mediterráneo:	ss.	XIV-XV’,	p.	103.	
207	Ferrer	i	Mallol,	M.	T.	‘Els	italians	a	terres	catalanes,	segles	XII-XV’,	Anuario	de	estudios	
medievales,	10	(1980),	pp.	394-412;	Soldani,	‘Il	commercio	internazionale	all’epoca	di	Martino	
l’Umano’,	pp.	525-526.	On	the	other	hand,	the	cities	of	Barcelona	and	Valencia,	along	with	the	
Generalitat	of	Catalonia	(the	Principality’s	administrative	body),	chartered	sometimes	galleys	
for	the	trade	with	the	Levant,	but	the	role	of	privately	owned	ships	was	incomparably	greater.	
In	1439,	a	one	of	these	Valencian	galleys	joined	the	convoy	to	Alexandria,	stopping	over	in	
Malaga,	Almeria	and	the	Maghribi	ports;	in	1443,	a	pair	of	large	Valencian	galleys	set	sail	for	
the	Eastern	Mediterranean	as	well	(see	Ashtor,	op.	cit.,	p.	388;	Igual,	David,	‘Navegación	y	
comercio	entre	Valencia	y	el	Norte	de	África	durante	el	siglo	XV’,	in	Trillo,	Carmen	(ed.),	
Relaciones	entre	el	Mediterráneo	cristiano	y	el	norte	de	África	en	época	medieval	y	moderna	
(Granada,	2004),	p.	256.	
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merchants	in	Granada,	on	a	much	larger	scale.	Nevertheless,	the	distinctive	feature	of	
the	Florentine	model	was	the	companies’	size,	which	made	unnecessary	to	maintain	a	
consular	network	since	they	could	deal	vis-à-vis	foreign	rulers	to	enforce	their	
contracts	before	third	parties208.	This	model,	however,	takes	for	granted	the	hugeness	
of	the	Florentine	companies,	whereas	in	the	Valencian	case	what	needs	to	be	
explained	is	precisely	the	level	of	commercial	organisation.	
	
Conclusion	
	
Throughout	this	paper	we	have	followed	the	merchants	from	Valencia	and	their	city	
council’s	correspondence	trying	to	unveil	the	contract	enforcement	mechanisms	
underpinning	the	extraordinary	commercial	development	that	experienced	the	city	in	
the	early	fifteenth	century.	
			In	the	first	part,	we	have	explored	the	contractual	arrangements	and	private	order	
solutions	that	lend	support	to	the	expansion	of	Valencian	commerce.	As	it	has	become	
apparent,	family	ties	and	national	comradeship	were	not	suited	to	sustain	alone	the	
kind	of	complex	transacting	that	is	observed	in	fifteenth	century	Valencia.	This	
notwithstanding,	merchant	informal	coalitions	sustained	by	reciprocity	and	reputation	
mechanisms	did	complement	and	enhance	the	workings	of	public	order	institutions,	
which	are	tackled	in	the	second	part	from	different	perspectives.	We	have	shown	how	
the	Consulate	of	the	Sea	and	its	body	of	maritime	legislation	were	particularly	aware	
of	agency	problems	and	tried	to	lessen	them	by	defining	contractual	rights	and	
obligations.	The	said	Consulate	administered	justice	also	for	fellow	Catalan	merchants	
from	Mallorca	and	the	Principality,	whereas	Valencian	businessmen	benefited	from	
the	Catalan	consular	network	that	had	been	slowly	developed	by	the	great	trading	
centre	of	Barcelona,	stretching	from	Bruges	to	the	route	of	the	isles	and	the	Levant.	
Such	consular	network	provided	a	formidable	framework	for	transmitting	contractual	
information,	detecting	when	contracts	had	been	breached	and	imposing	penalties	on	
the	violators.	Furthermore,	the	extensive	privileges	enjoyed	by	the	Catalans	along	the	
route	of	the	isles	made	the	Catalan-Aragonese	affiliation	a	valuable	asset,	enabling	
agents	to	credibly	commit	to	their	contracts.	Following	chapters	have	shown	that	
cross-national	contract	enforcement	was	typically	based	on	reciprocity	and	channelled	
through	the	consular	system:	foreigners	would	turn	to	Valencian	and	Catalan	
consulates	when	conflicts	arose	with	Valencian	and	Catalan	citizens,	on	the	
expectation	that	the	same	would	work	the	other	way	round.		
			An	aspect	that	stands	out	is	that	Valencian	businessmen	developed	distinctive	
contract	enforcement	strategies	when	dealing	with	their	own	sphere	of	influence,	
Barbaria	and	Granada,	in	which	common	Catalan	facilities	were	inadequate	or	not	
available.	Catalan	consulates	appointed	by	the	king	are	found	in	Granada	at	least	for																																																									
	208	Apellániz,	‘Florentine	networks	in	the	Middle	East	in	the	early	Renaissance’,	pp.,	125-127.	
Earlier	on,	extensive	use	of	extradition	treaties	with	other	Italian	cities	allowed	Florence	to	
overcome	the	problems	of	legal	fragmentation	and	punish	cheaters	beyond	its	frontiers	(Greif,	
A.	Institutions	and	the	Path	to	the	Modern	Economy,	pp.	340-345).	
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1418	and	1459,	yet	their	contract	enforcement	role	seemingly	remained	low-key:	
Valencian	merchants	turned	to	Muslim	courts	to	settle	both	mixed	cases	and	disputes	
with	fellow	citizens	and	Christians.	Their	contract	enforcement	mechanism	in	those	
parts	relied	on	individual	strategies	of	political	influence	over	local	governments,	semi-
private	consulates	and	the	special	support	on	the	part	of	municipal	and	royal	officials.	
In	Barbaria,	where	an	unconventional	“Christian”	consular	network	did	exist,	its	self-
managed	and	unaccountable	character	probably	compelled	merchants	to	turn	to	
comparable	individual	strategies,	as	the	cases	of	the	Rotlan	brothers	in	Garb	or	the	
“very	favoured”	Francesch	Montfort	in	Tlemcen	suggest.	Its	shortcomings	might	be	
one	of	the	reasons	why	Juan	II	appointed	a	general	consul	for	Granada,	Fez	and	
Tlemcen	in	1459,	yet	we	are	still	lacking	much	information	to	venture	a	complete	
picture	of	this	process.	
			Our	answers	are	based	on	the	documentary	evidence	available	so	far,	yet	this	
evidence	needs	to	be	further	expanded	in	following	research.	Many	sources	still	
remain	in	the	several	Valencian	and	Aragonese	archives	waiting	to	be	explored	and	
used	to	draw	a	thicker	picture	of	the	contract	enforcement	institutions	that	governed	
the	Valencian	expansion.	Such	a	work	should,	in	the	first	place,	encompass	a	longer	
period	of	time,	probably	from	the	second	half	of	the	fourteenth	century	to	the	mid-
fifteenth	century.	In	the	second	place,	it	should	dig	into	the	council’s	and	the	notarial	
documents,	for	none	of	these	sources	can	draw	a	complete	picture	separately.	A	
network	approach	to	the	Valencian	and	Mallorcan	businessmen	trading	in	Granada	
and	Barbaria	is	particularly	promising,	for	it	might	cast	light	on	the	particular	strategies	
undertaken	by	elite	and	low	rank	merchant,	allowing	us	to	assertively	answer	the	
question	posed	throughout	this	paper.	It	should	be	noted,	in	any	case,	that	our	main	
aim	was	to	highlight	an	aspect	that	has	usually	been	neglected	by	the	literature,	
namely,	the	fact	that	Valencian	merchants	and	institutions	developed	an	original	
approach	to	contract	enforcement,	clearly	distinct	from	their	Barcelonan	counterparts	
in	those	parts	in	which	the	Catalan	consular	network	was	inadequate	or	absent.	Such	
an	approach,	based	on	individual	rather	than	collective	action,	plausibly	had	several	
implications	for	long-term	growth	that	might	allow	us	to	look	at	the	conspicuous	
problem	of	Valencia’s	Golden	Age	from	a	different	angle.	
			Our	findings	regarding	Granada	and	Barbaria	should	be	put	both	in	relationship	with	
historiographical	and	theoretical	debates.	This	paper	explicitly	aimed	to	put	to	an	end	
the	unilateral	narratives	of	the	Catalano-Aragonese	commercial	expansion.	Authors	
like	Carl	Rohne,	Claude	Carrère,	Mario	del	Treppo	and	Maria	Teresa	Ferrer209	have	
usually	placed	all	the	emphasis	on	the	Catalan	consular	network	monitored	from	
Barcelona,	assuming	that	Valencian	merchants	and	officials	just	played	a	passive	role	
within	its	developments.	By	focusing	exclusively	in	the	interplay	between	the	Crown,	
the	Council	of	Barcelona	and	her	Consulate	of	the	Sea	—however	pivotal	in	the	Catalan	
expansion—,	the	literature	has	overlooked	the	development	of	more	polycentric	and	
comparative	approaches	that	would	allow	us	to	draw	a	richer	and	more	realistic	
picture	of	such	an	expansion.	A	prominent	exception	to	this	current	is	the	work	of																																																									209	Rohne,	The	origins	and	development	of	the	catalán	consulados	ultramarinos	from	the	
thirteenth	to	the	fifteenth	centuries;	Carrère,	Barcelone,	centre	économique;	Del	Treppo,	I	
mercanti	catalani	e	l’espansione	della	Corona	d’Aragona	nel	secolo	XV;	Ferrer	i	Mallol,	‘El	
consolat	de	mar	i	els	consolats	d’ultramar,	instrument	i	manifestació	de	l’expansió	del	comerç	
català’.	
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Daniel	Duran,	who	has	extensively	worked	on	the	Mallorcan	case	both	within	and	
without	the	Barcelonan	network210.	By	going	beyond	the	letter	of	the	law,	he	has	been	
able	to	show	to	what	extent	differed	the	strategies	pursued	by	the	elite	merchants	
compared	with	their	low-rank	counterparts.	In	fifteenth	century	Constantinople,	for	
instance,	whereas	the	Council	of	Barcelona	seemingly	backed	the	interests	of	its	elite	
merchants,	the	broad	merchant	community	tried	to	draw	support	from	the	
monarchy211.	Our	paper,	insofar	as	it	has	analysed	resembling	cases	in	Granada	and	
North	Africa,	should	be	seen	as	a	contribution	in	this	current	of	research.	The	
Valencian	case	is	especially	suited	for	comparison	with	the	Frankish	trading	networks	
in	the	Levant	studied	by	Francisco	Apellániz,	for	he	explicitly	aimed	to	examine	the	
strategies	pursued	by	individual	merchants	in	the	absence	of	strong	public	support212.	
In	that	sense,	this	paper	should	provide	a	new	perspective	to	the	long-standing	
historiographical	debate	on	the	relationship	between	the	Aragonese	Crown	and	the	
Catalan	merchants213.	It	is	rather	difficult	to	establish	a	detailed	cause-effect	
relationship	between	political	imperialism	and	merchant	interests,	but	we	can	still	
analyse	the	consequences	for	trade	of	a	certain	institutional	background,	as	we	have	
attempted	here.	Pursuing	in	this	aim	might	cast	light	upon	a	paramount	question	
within	the	history	of	the	Aragonese	confederacy.		
			The	Valencian	case	stands	out	not	only	as	a	distinctive	approach	with	regards	the	
contract	enforcement	models	proposed	in	the	neo-institutional	literature,	namely	for	
Genoa	and	Venice214,	but	also	as	a	reminder	that	both	historians	and	economists	
should	work	for	the	conciliation	between	theory	and	historical	research.	The	late	
medieval	Mediterranean	world,	as	fragmented	and	diverse	as	it	was,	in	which	each	
town,	region	and	state	approached	similar	challenges	on	a	distinctive	way,	calls	for	a	
close	collaboration	between	disciplines	before	it	can	bear	its	most	prized	fruits.	
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